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CONSIDER THE CAREGIVERS: 
REIMAGINING LABOR AND IMMIGRATION 
LAW TO BENEFIT HOME CARE WORKERS 
AND THEIR CLIENTS 
Abstract: A looming shortage of over half a million direct care workers within 
the next decade threatens to leave elderly and disabled individuals without much-
needed care. Existing U.S. labor and immigration laws render long-term care 
work undesirable and providers prone to exploitation. Despite the extension of 
the Fair Labor Standards Act’s protections to many home care workers in 2015, 
flawed enforcement mechanisms prevent workers from effectuating their new-
found rights. Additionally, restrictive visa programs and crackdowns on undocu-
mented employment limit noncitizens’ ability to secure positions in the industry. 
As a result, the home care system facilitates the exploitation of home care work-
ers, contributes to high turnover rates, and creates instability for elderly and disa-
bled individuals who rely on caregivers to remain in their communities. This Note 
argues that Congress should support strategic labor law enforcement initiatives, 
grant amnesty to undocumented workers, and reform the employment-based visa 
program to give higher preference to all essential workers. This Note further 
demonstrates how these actions will benefit both caregivers and their clients. 
INTRODUCTION 
Marjorie Salmon, who immigrated to Brooklyn, New York from Jamaica, 
has provided home care services to elderly clients for over two decades.1 In 
exchange for offering around-the-clock care to a man in his seventies who suf-
fers from dementia and Parkinson’s disease, she receives $160 per day as well 
as food and lodging.2 Her client has good and bad moments—one morning he 
threatens to hurt her, and another day he compliments her appearance.3 Ms. 
Salmon cooks her client’s meals, helps him bathe, and cleans up his soiled dia-
pers.4 She keeps the doors locked so that he does not wander away.5 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Andy Newman, On the Job, 24 Hours a Day, 27 Days a Month, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 2, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/02/nyregion/home-health-aide.html [https://perma.cc/N382-
S6RL]. 
 2 Id. 
 3 See id. (describing how Marjorie Salmon’s client’s demeanor shifts due to his struggle with 
Alzheimer’s disease). 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. 
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Home care workers like Ms. Salmon provide direct care to elderly and 
disabled individuals in their homes.6 Although home care industry norms and 
specific caregiver-client relationships vary, Ms. Salmon’s story exemplifies the 
nation’s reliance on home care workers to perform essential, yet psychologi-
cally and physically taxing services for very low wages.7 Demographic and 
social trends are increasing demand for home care workers such as Ms. Salm-
on.8 The problem of how to attract and retain these workers will grow more 
pressing in coming years, and the United States will experience a substantial 
shortage of caregivers—unless labor and immigration laws affecting the indus-
try undergo substantial changes.9 
The enforcement mechanisms available to home care workers who want 
to assert their rights under existing federal wage and hour laws remain weak.10 
Home care workers with claims for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act 
(FLSA), which requires payment of minimum and overtime wages and out-
lines limited workplace standards, must file complaints with the Department of 
Labor (DOL) or initiate private lawsuits.11 Home care workers cannot rely on 
                                                                                                                           
 6 See KEZIA SCALES, PHI, IT’S TIME TO CARE: A DETAILED PROFILE OF AMERICA’S DIRECT 
CARE WORKFORCE 3–4 (2020), https://phinational.org/resource/its-time-to-care-a-detailed-profile-of-
americas-direct-care-workforce/ [https://perma.cc/V5B3-AJ5H] (explaining that direct care workers 
assist their clients with activities such as attending to household chores and consuming meals). 
 7 See ELANA D. BUCH, INEQUALITIES OF AGING: PARADOXES OF INDEPENDENCE IN AMERICAN 
HOME CARE 5, 9 (2018) (describing the minimal pay home care workers receive and the emotional 
labor that they must perform when interacting with clients); Soo Oh, The Future of Work Is the Low-
Wage Health Care Job, VOX (July 3, 2017), https://www.vox.com/2017/7/3/15872260/health-direct-
care-jobs [https://web.archive.org/web/20201028132643/https://www.vox.com/2017/7/3/15872260/
health-direct-care-jobs] (illustrating how home care work puts stress on workers’ bodies). Home care 
workers need to have the strength to lift equipment and brace clients. Oh, supra. Moreover, the home 
care industry has an elevated incidence of injury compared to many other fields. Id. 
 8 See BUCH, supra note 7, at 3–4 (linking the increasing need for home care to shifts in the com-
position of the population as well as changes in family and gender dynamics). 
 9 See Robyn I. Stone & Natasha Bryant, The Politics of Immigration: Who Will Care for Grand-
ma?, 42 GENERATIONS—J. AM. SOC’Y ON AGING 50, 54–55 (2018–2019) (suggesting that allowing 
more immigrants to work as caregivers could mitigate the shortage); Leah Zallman et al., Care for 
America’s Elderly and Disabled People Relies on Immigrant Labor, 38 HEALTH AFF. 919, 925 (2019) 
(listing policy changes, including increases in wages, improved training, and immigration reform to 
tackle retention problems and attract more home care workers). 
 10 See Nicole Hallett, The Problem of Wage Theft, 37 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 93, 104–05, 125 
(2019) (indicating that low-wage and immigrant workers struggle to address Fair Labor Standards Act 
(FLSA) violations by lodging complaints and pursuing litigation); David Weil & Amanda Pyles, Why 
Complain? Complaints, Compliance, and the Problem of Enforcement in the U.S. Workplace, 27 
COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 59, 59 (2005) (explaining that the Department of Labor (DOL) largely 
relies on employee complaints to enforce the FLSA and launch investigations). 
 11 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219; Hallett, supra note 10, at 104–05; 
Weil & Pyles, supra note 10, at 62. The DOL investigates employers in the absence of worker com-
plaints, but the agency often relies on workers to draw its attention to potential violations. Weil & 
Pyles, supra note 10, at 59. In 2004, nearly 80% of the Wage and Hour Division’s (WHD) investiga-
tions occurred in response to complaints. Id. After the DOL obtained new leadership during the 
Obama administration, the proportion of inquiries initiated by employees fell to less than 50% in 
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the DOL’s Wage and Hour Division (WHD) to proactively investigate their 
employers.12 Additionally, intentional worker misclassification excludes in-
creasing numbers of home care workers from the FLSA’s protections.13 Indi-
viduals working directly for clients and their families are left with few safe-
guards.14 These regulatory gaps exacerbate severe retention problems in the 
industry, which has a turnover rate hovering around fifty percent.15 
Although experts predict that the aging baby-boomer generation will in-
crease demand for home care services in the coming decades, immigration re-
strictions limit the pool of workers available to fill these roles.16 Employment-
based visa programs give preference to foreign-born workers with high levels 
of education and professional skill, effectively foreclosing lawful opportunities 
for prospective home care workers to secure positions in the industry.17 In turn, 
limited legal immigration options may prompt undocumented individuals to 
seek off-the-books employment in the informal home care sector, where wage 
and hour regulations do not apply.18 
                                                                                                                           
2017. David Weil, Creating a Strategic Enforcement Approach to Address Wage Theft: One Academ-
ic’s Journey in Organizational Change, J. INDUST. RELS., June 2018, at 1, 5. 
 12 See Janice Fine, New Approaches to Enforcing Labor Standards: Co-enforcement Partnerships 
Between Government and Civil Society Are Showing the Way Forward, 2017 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 143, 
145 (remarking that enforcement agencies lack the resources to audit all workplaces). In 2012, there 
was less than a 1% chance that the DOL would investigate a given employer for violating federal 
wage and hour laws within the year. Daniel J. Galvin, Deterring Wage Theft: Alt-labor, State Politics, 
and the Policy Determinants of Minimum Wage Compliance, 14 PERSP. ON POL., 324, 327 (2016). 
 13 See NELP: NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT, INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR CLASSIFICATION IN HOME 
CARE 1–2 (2015), https://www.nelp.org/wp-content/uploads/Home-Care-Misclassification-Fact-Sheet.
pdf [https://perma.cc/2FK3-CGSZ] (identifying misclassification as a threat to home care workers’ 
ability to assert their rights). 
 14 See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(15) (exempting those providing companionship services from the 
FLSA’s minimum wage provisions); Third Party Employment, 20 C.F.R. § 552.109 (2020) (permit-
ting family members who act as joint employers to claim the companionship services exemption); 
Companionship Services, 20 C.F.R. § 552.6 (defining a companionship services provider). The 
DOL’s third-party employer regulation allows families that act as joint employers to avoid paying 
minimum and overtime wages. 20 C.F.R. § 552.109. 
 15 See Peggie R. Smith, Aging and Caring in the Home: Regulating Paid Domesticity in the 
Twenty-First Century, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1835, 1847 (2007) (estimating that approximately half of 
home care workers leave their jobs every year). 
 16 Zallman et al., supra note 9, at 919, 925. 
 17 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(1)–(5); see Sarah J. Rasalam, Note, Improving the Immigration Policy of 
the United States to Fulfill the Caregiving Needs of America’s Elderly Population: The Alternatives to 
Outsourcing Grandma, 16 ELDER L.J. 405, 424 (2008) (arguing that the United States needs to estab-
lish a visa program for home care workers to meet growing demand for long-term care); Kayleigh 
Scalzo, Note, American Idol: The Domestic and International Implications of Preferencing the Highly 
Education and Highly Skilled in U.S. Immigration Law, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 926, 930 (2011) (not-
ing that U.S. visa programs give preference to highly skilled workers). 
 18 See Zallman et al., supra note 9, at 922–23 (stating that undocumented individuals who provide 
long-term care services are more likely than U.S. citizens to work for third-party agencies or families 
through the gray market). 
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Unions, think tanks, and legislators have proposed various policies to im-
prove home care jobs and attract additional care workers to meet the growing 
demand.19 The Service Employees International Union organizes home care 
workers as part of its “Fight for $15” campaign to raise the federal minimum 
wage.20 Scholars recommend changes to immigration policy that would make 
it easier for prospective home care workers to obtain visas.21 Members of Con-
gress introduced the Direct CARE Opportunity Act in September 2019 to pro-
vide funding to organizations that recruit and train home care workers.22 De-
spite the urgent need for such reforms, efforts to raise the federal minimum 
wage, change or create immigration programs, or enact legislation aimed at 
improving home care jobs have thus far come up short.23 
This Note presents two policy recommendations to address labor and im-
migration issues in the U.S. home care industry.24 It first argues that Congress 
                                                                                                                           
 19 See infra notes 20–23 and accompanying text (elaborating on various stakeholders’ proposed 
plans to reform the home care industry and address the likely shortfall of home care workers in the 
near future). 
 20 Why It Matters?, SEIU, https://www.seiu.org/cards/home-care-and-the-fight-for-15 [https://
perma.cc/R75V-KJAU]. The “Fight for $15” movement pushes to increase the minimum wage and 
unionize low-wage workers. About Us, FIGHT FOR $15, https://fightfor15.org/about-us/ [https://perma.
cc/XM88-B8TK]. It originated when fast food workers went on strike in 2012 to demand higher wag-
es and the ability to join a union. Id. 
 21 CYNTHIA HESS & JANE HENRICI, INST. FOR WOMEN’S POL’Y RSCH., INCREASING PATHWAYS 
TO LEGAL STATUS FOR IMMIGRANT IN-HOME CARE WORKERS 1 (2013), https://iwpr.org/
publications/increasing-pathways-to-legal-status-for-immigrant-in-home-care-workers/ [https://perma.
cc/HAX9-SHY3] (offering several proposals for immigration reform that would allow noncitizens to 
legally work in the home care field); Rasalam, supra note 17, at 424. 
 22 Direct CARE Opportunity Act, H.R. 4397, 116th Cong. (2019); Direct CARE Opportunity Act, 
S. 2521, 116th Cong. (2019). The Direct CARE Opportunity Act would establish a grant program for 
organizations to offer direct care workers increased training and professional opportunities. H.R. 
4397; S. 2521. Institutions seeking funding would provide proposals outlining their projects. H.R. 
4397; S. 2521. These programs would aim to attract new direct care workers and encourage them to 
stay in the industry. H.R. 4397; S. 2521. The bill could improve home care work by providing more 
training and offering new pathways for advancement. Alexia Fernández Campbell, Home Care Work-
ers Have a Lousy Job. A New Bill in Congress Aims to Change That., VOX (Sept. 19, 2019), https://
www.vox.com/2019/9/19/20868302/home-care-workers-care-opportunity-act [https://web.archive.
org/web/20200930054541/https://www.vox.com/2019/9/19/20868302/home-care-workers-care-
opportunity-act]. The bill, however, does not address immigration reform for home care workers. See 
H.R. 4397 (lacking any reference to immigration legislation); S. 2521(missing language concerning 
changes to immigration laws). 
 23 See Hallett, supra note 10, at 95 (noting that the federal minimum wage has remained stagnant 
since 2009); H.R.4397—Direct Creation, Advancement, and Retention of Employment Opportunity 
Act, CONGRESS.GOV (2019–2020), https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/4397/all-
actions-without-amendments?s=1&r=7 [https://perma.cc/B6SV-R2GU] (showing no activity related 
to the CARE Opportunity Act after the House referred it to two committees in September 2019); 
Elaine Kamarck & Christine Stenglein, Can Immigration Reform Happen? A Look Back, BROOKINGS 
(Feb. 11, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2019/02/11/can-immigration-reform-happen-
a-look-back/ [https://perma.cc/WRL3-RCPW] (reporting that Congress has failed to pass immigration 
far-reaching reform legislation since 1986). 
 24 See infra notes 25–26 and accompanying text (describing the proposed reforms). 
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should enact the Wage Theft Prevention and Wage Recovery Act (WTPWRA) 
or similar legislation to bolster FLSA protections for home care workers 
through strategic enforcement and community partnerships.25 This Note further 
contends that the legislature should grant amnesty to undocumented immi-
grants, including home care workers, and reformulate the preference structure 
of immigrant employment-based visa programs to proactively address the 
shortfall of caregivers in the United States.26 Part I of this Note provides a 
basic overview of employment in the home care industry as well as the labor 
and immigration laws that impact it.27 Part II discusses how this legal frame-
work creates specific challenges for home care workers.28 Finally, Part III pro-
poses changes to the FLSA’s enforcement mechanisms as well as immigration 
reforms to benefit both caregivers and their clients.29 
I. SITUATING THE HOME CARE INDUSTRY AT THE CROSSROADS  
OF LABOR AND IMMIGRATION LAW 
Because a significant number of noncitizens work in the home care indus-
try, U.S. labor and immigration law both shape the regulation of this burgeon-
ing field.30 Home care workers are often resigned to difficult conditions and 
inadequate compensation due to gaps in the current legal framework.31 Section 
                                                                                                                           
 25 Wage Theft Prevention and Wage Recovery Act, H.R. 3712, 116th Cong. (2019); Wage Theft 
Prevention and Wage Recovery Act, S. 2101, 116th Cong. (2019). The Wage Theft Prevention and 
Wage Recovery Act (WTPWRA) would target wage and hour law violations in industries where abuse is 
most pervasive and foster collaboration between the government and grassroots organizations. See H.R. 
3712 § 3(4)(B)–(C) (listing the purposes of the proposed legislation to amend the FLSA). This law 
would also create more severe punishment for wage theft, allow workers to receive complete re-
numeration for unpaid wages, and facilitate workers’ ability to recoup earnings through litigation. Id. 
§ 3(1)–(3). 
 26 See HESS & HENRICI, supra note 21, at 15 (highlighting an amnesty program as a means to 
improve conditions for noncitizens working in the home care industry); Stone & Bryant, supra note 9, 
at 54–55 (advocating for the expansion of visa programs to attract direct care workers); Conor Frie-
dersdorf, The Nationalist Case for Amnesty, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.
com/ideas/archive/2019/02/immigration-amnesty/582688/ [https://perma.cc/39B6-7FLR] (arguing 
that amnesty would benefit U.S. citizens as well as undocumented immigrants); Rasalam, supra note 
17, at 439 (arguing for the creation of a new visa category for home care workers). 
 27 See infra notes 30–158 and accompanying text. 
 28 See infra notes 159–239 and accompanying text. 
 29 See infra notes 241–287 and accompanying text. 
 30 See Smith, supra note 15, at 1837 (defining “home care” as services provided by compensated 
individuals so that elderly and disabled people can attend to their daily needs, including making 
meals, getting dressed, using the bathroom, and cleaning the house); Zallman et al., supra note 9, at 
923–24 (illustrating that immigrants comprise nearly one third of the home care workforce). Home 
care workers fall under the larger umbrella of “long-term services and supports” (LTSS) providers. 
SCALES, supra note 6, at 7. In addition to working in individual residences, LTSS workers perform 
services in places such as nursing homes and adult daycare centers. Id. 
 31 See Laura Dresser, Cleaning and Caring in the Home: Shared Problems? Shared Possibilities, 
in THE GLOVES-OFF ECONOMY: WORKPLACE STANDARDS AT THE BOTTOM OF AMERICA’S LABOR 
MARKET 111, 117 (Annette Bernhardt et al. eds., 2008) (articulating that home care workers receive 
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A of this Part describes the features of modern home care, including the de-
mographics of the workforce and predictions regarding caregiver shortages.32 
Section B provides insight into the evolution of federal wage and hour protec-
tions for professional home care workers.33 Section C outlines immigration 
laws that affect the home care workforce. 34 
A. Caring for Elderly and Disabled Individuals at Home 
The home care industry consists of agencies and individuals that provide 
direct care to seniors and disabled individuals in their own residences in ex-
change for payment.35 Although workers performing these tasks possess vari-
ous titles, this Note defines “home care worker” as a person who provides ser-
vices to elderly and/or disabled clients in their homes for compensation.36 
Home care workers help clients accomplish activities of daily living, which 
can include cooking meals, completing household chores, and putting on 
clothes.37 The professionalization of home care developed as part of a New 
Deal initiative to employ caregivers to assist seniors and those with enduring 
medical conditions in their residences.38 
Demand for home care services has ballooned in recent years due to de-
mographic shifts and increased interest in receiving long-term care at home.39 
                                                                                                                           
low wages and rarely enjoy benefits like employer-provided health insurance); Julia Lippitt, Note, 
Protecting the Protectors: A Call for Fair Working Conditions for Home Health Care Workers, 19 
ELDER L.J. 219, 221–22 (2011) (describing home care work as mentally and physically draining). 
 32 See infra notes 35–66 and accompanying text. 
 33 See infra notes 67–112 and accompanying text. 
 34 See infra notes 113–158 and accompanying text. 
 35 See SCALES, supra note 6, at 7–8 (noting that caregivers can work directly for their clients, 
their clients’ families, or for third-party agencies); Smith, supra note 15, at 1837 (specifying that 
home care workers receive payment for their work in clients’ homes). Some home care clients pay for 
services themselves, whereas others use private or government-sponsored health insurance programs. 
Nancy E. Shurtz, Long-Term Care and the Tax Code: A Feminist Perspective on Elder Care, 20 GEO. 
J. GENDER & L. 107, 144–49 (2019). 
 36 See Smith, supra note 15, at 1838 (listing alternative titles for workers that care for clients in 
the home, including “home-health aides, home-care aides, and personal-care aides” (footnotes omit-
ted)). According to the DOL, home health aides can administer limited medical services under a 
nurse’s supervision. Lippitt, supra note 31, at 221. In contrast, home care and personal aides do not 
need supervision and may assist clients only with tasks such as dressing, eating, and cleaning. Id. 
 37 Smith, supra note 15, at 1837. 
 38 Jennifer Klein & Eileen Boris, “We Have to Take It to the Top!”: Workers, State Policy, and 
the Making of Homecare, 61 BUFF. L. REV. 293, 298 (2013). During the Great Depression, the gov-
ernment instituted programs intended to facilitate economic growth and increase employment. Id. The 
Works Progress Administration (WPA) administered the Homemaker Service, which provided unem-
ployed women with childcare positions. Id. The WPA also hired workers to provide services to elderly 
and ill individuals in their homes, thereby moving them out of hospitals. Id. This workforce largely 
consisted of Black women who had worked in domestic roles prior to their unemployment. Id. 
 39 Smith, supra note 15, at 1837 (linking the increase in the need for home workers to the growth 
of the U.S. elderly population). 
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Elderly baby boomers will enlarge the share of the U.S. population aged sixty-
five and older to over twenty percent by 2030.40 In addition, as people live 
longer, they are more likely to require ongoing care for disabilities and long-
term medical conditions.41 Demand for professional home care is linked to in-
creases in the number of women seeking employment outside the home, to 
more individuals residing far away from aging family members, and to elderly 
people outliving their relatives.42 At the same time, more elderly individuals 
wish to receive direct care at home instead of in nursing or other long-term 
care facilities.43 Moreover, experts anticipate that interest in home care will 
rise dramatically as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic.44 These changes, 
coupled with the rapid expansion of the U.S. elderly population, could contrib-
ute to a shortfall of over half a million direct care workers within ten years.45 
                                                                                                                           
 40 SANDRA L. COLBY & JENNIFER M. ORTMAN, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE BABY BOOM CO-
HORT IN THE UNITED STATES: 2012 TO 2060, at 2 (2014), https://www.census.gov/library/
publications/2014/demo/p25-1141.html [https://perma.cc/8RBR-7BNM]. Baby boomers consist of 
U.S. residents born between the end of World War II and the mid-1960s. Id. The eldest members of 
this generation started to turn sixty-five in 2011. Id. At that time, they numbered approximately seven-
ty-seven million individuals. Id. Baby boomers are expected to increase the percentage of Americans 
between the ages of sixty-five and eighty-four to 18% and the population over the age of eighty-four 
to 2.5% by 2030. Id. at 7. In 2018, 16% of the U.S. population was over the age of sixty-four. Age and 
Sex, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2018), https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?q=elderly&tid=ACSST1Y
2018.S0101&hidePreview=true [https://perma.cc/WVJ7-PVDJ]. Although the total number of baby 
boomers will decline as the population ages, this demographic shift will increase demand for long-
term care. COLBY & ORTMAN, supra note 40, at 2; Zallman et al., supra note 9, at 919. 
 41 See Smith, supra note 15, at 1844 (asserting that enhanced life expectancy increases demand 
for long-term direct care). 
 42 Id. at 1844–45. Women supply the lion’s share of home care provided without compensation. 
Id. at 1845. Factors including the lack of vacancies in nursing homes and increased numbers of indi-
viduals who can pay for home care have also contributed to the increased preference for home care as 
opposed to institutional options. Rebecca M. Fowler, Home Healthcare Workers and the Fair Labor 
Standards Act, 1 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 107, 109 (2008) (listing these developments as contrib-
uting to the expansion of home care services). 
 43 See Lippitt, supra note 31, at 220 (citing lower costs and enhanced efficacy as factors contrib-
uting to the growing preference for home care). An ethnographic study of caregivers and their clients 
indicates that seniors prefer home care as a means to retain greater independence as their health de-
clines. BUCH, supra note 7, at 4. 
 44 Daniella Silva, Coronavirus Concerns Show Enhanced Need, Demand for Home Care, Experts 
Say, NBC NEWS (May 23, 2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/coronavirus-concerns-show-
increased-need-demand-home-care-experts-say-n1211261 [https://perma.cc/JH7A-9AHZ] (mention-
ing families’ concerns about placing seniors in long-term care facilities due to the spread of COVID-
19 and the increased need for home care workers to assist virus survivors). 
 45 Zallman et al., supra note 9, at 920 (citing NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH WORKFORCE ANALYSIS, 
HEALTH WORKFORCE PROJECTIONS: NURSING ASSISTANTS AND HOME HEALTH AIDES 1 (2016), 
https://bhw.hrsa.gov/sites/default/files/bhw/nchwa/projections/directcareworkersfactsheet.pdf [https://
perma.cc/9J9F-Q56H]) (estimating that the projected 34% increase in demand for direct care workers 
will produce a shortage of 650,000 workers); supra note 43 and accompanying text (surveying social 
factors that contribute to the increased demand for home care services). 
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This demand, coupled with the high cost of long-term care, has created an 
industry that spans the formal and informal economies.46 Although Medicare 
does not cover home care services in most instances, Medicaid offers limited 
funding for certain types of caregiving in the home.47 Given the lack of cover-
age through public programs, individuals often purchase private insurance or pay 
out-of-pocket for care.48 Home care workers can function as employees, work as 
independent contractors for third-party agencies, or contract directly with con-
sumers.49 The latter arrangement operates as an informal “gray market.”50 
Despite the home care industry’s status as one of the most rapidly ex-
panding fields in the United States, workers receive minimal compensation.51 
Salaries remain well below the $15.00 mark, with an average hourly wage of 
                                                                                                                           
 46 Howard Gleckman, Where Will Our Home Care Aides Come from?, FORBES (Feb. 18, 2018), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/howardgleckman/2018/02/28/where-will-our-home-care-aides-come-
from/?sh=2bcbe5f0383f [https://perma.cc/L77S-DRZL] (explaining that many families hire caregivers 
directly because they cannot otherwise afford home care services); see GENWORTH FIN., INC., GEN-
WORTH COST OF CARE SURVEY 2019: SUMMARY AND METHODOLOGY 1 (2019) (providing estimates 
concerning the cost of home care services), https://pro.genworth.com/riiproweb/productinfo/pdf/131168.
pdf [https://perma.cc/E2GB-W2XB]; Shurtz, supra note 35, at 156–58 (describing funding mecha-
nisms for home health care). See generally Demetra Smith Nightingale & Stephen A. Wandner, In-
formal and Nonstandard Employment in the United States: Implications for Low-Income Working 
Families, URBAN INST. BRIEF 20 (Urban Inst., Washington, D.C.), Aug. 2011, at 1, 1, https://www.
urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/32791/412372-informal-and-nonstandard-employment-in-the-
united-states.pdf [https://perma.cc/3GFX-CVPJ] (defining the scope of the informal economy). The 
median price for a year of home care services was $52,624 in 2019. GENWORTH FIN., INC., supra, at 
1. 
 47 See Shurtz, supra note 35, at 156–58 (outlining which home care services public health insur-
ance programs cover). Medicare will cover home care expenses only if the services meet specific 
criteria. Id. at 157. For example, services must follow a period of hospitalization lasting at least three 
days and cannot involve around-the-clock care. Id. In contrast to Medicare beneficiaries, Medicaid 
recipients may obtain waivers from their state governments to fund home care services. Id. 
 48 Id. at 158. In 2019, the median hourly rate for home care provided through a licensed agency 
was $23.00. GENWORTH FIN., INC., supra note 46, at 2. 
 49 Smith, supra note 15, at 1846. Employers typically exercise a large degree of control over their 
employees, including supervising their work and purchasing the materials they need to complete their 
tasks. Abigail S. Rosenfeld, Comment, ABC to AB 5, The Supreme Court of California Modernizes 
Common Law Doctrine in Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court, 61 B.C. L. REV. E. 
SUPP. II.-112, II.-112 n.1 (2020) (citing Employee, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019)), 
https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol61/iss9/13 [https://perma.cc/Z7GE-HZ8P]. In contrast, 
traditional independent contractors function more like small businesses, and the hiring enterprise ex-
erts less control over their activities. Id. at II.-112 n.2 (citing Independent Contractor, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY, supra). 
 50 See Paula Span, If Immigrants Are Pushed Out, Who Will Care for the Elderly?, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/02/health/illegal-immigrants-caregivers.html [https://
perma.cc/2CWN-XW9B] (describing the “gray market” as an economic phenomenon wherein clients 
contract with workers outside of the formal employment system). 
 51 See Klein & Boris, supra note 38, at 295 (describing home care as the quickest growing profes-
sion and characterizing the work as being low-paid); Fastest Growing Occupations, U.S. BUREAU 
LAB. STAT., https://www.bls.gov/emp/tables/fastest-growing-occupations.htm#ep_table_103.f.1 [https://
perma.cc/EK7H-9YPU] (Sept. 1, 2020) (listing “Home health and personal care aides” as one of the 
fastest-growing jobs in the United States). 
2021] Reimagining Labor & Immigration Law to Benefit Home Caregivers 323 
$12.71 in 2019.52 Moreover, home care positions frequently lack benefits such 
as employer-provided health insurance.53 Due to subpar wages and the nature 
of the job, some home care providers work for hours on end without time to 
rest.54 Thus, many have to turn to public assistance programs to survive.55 The 
industry suffers from a high incidence of turnover, which is due in part to inad-
equate compensation and benefits.56 
The dearth of home care industry regulation reflects the abysmal treat-
ment of domestic work and the people who perform it throughout history.57 
The low renumeration and social standing associated with home care work 
reflects deeply rooted racism and sexism.58 Negative attitudes toward work 
performed in the home stem from slavery, when white slave holders forced 
Black women to serve as caregivers and housekeepers.59 Additionally, the so-
cietal expectation that women should care for elderly and sick family members 
                                                                                                                           
 52 Occupational Employment and Wages, May 2019, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT., https://www.bls.
gov/oes/current/oes311011.htm [https://perma.cc/7YPS-8LMV] (July 6, 2020). This estimate encom-
passes home care workers who work in a variety of settings. Id. The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
categorizes “Home Health Aides” as those who perform very limited health care services as well as 
companionship services. Id. By comparison, the average hourly wage for registered nurses was $37.24 
in 2019. May 2019 National Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates United States, U.S. BU-
REAU LAB. STAT., https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes_nat.htm#00-0000 [https://perma.cc/R8GC-
T4RR] (Mar. 31, 2020). 
 53 Lippitt, supra note 31, at 222; Dresser, supra note 31, at 117 (explaining that home care em-
ployers often do not offer benefits to workers, including health insurance). 
 54 Lippitt, supra note 31, at 222. In some circumstances, home care workers provide services 
nonstop for a full twenty-four-hour period. Id. 
 55 SCALES, supra note 6, at 14; Smith, supra note 15, at 1849 (noting that approximately one third of 
single parent home care workers get food stamps); Alexia Fernández Campbell, Home Health Aides Care 
for the Elderly. Who Will Care for Them?, VOX (Aug. 21, 2019), https://www.vox.com/the-highlight/
2019/8/21/20694768/home-health-aides-elder-care [https://web.archive.org/web/20201102115912/
https://www.vox.com/the-highlight/2019/8/21/20694768/home-health-aides-elder-care] (asserting that 
many home care workers need help to eat and pay their bills). A recent report indicates that over 40% 
of direct care workers utilize government assistance programs. SCALES, supra note 6, at 14. 
 56 See SCALES, supra note 6, at 19–20 (asserting that higher pay and enhanced benefits would 
decrease issues with turnover in the home care industry); Smith, supra note 15, at 1847 (noting that 
retention is a huge challenge in the home care industry. 
 57 Domestic Service Employment, 29 C.F.R. § 552.3 (2020) (defining domestic work as labor 
performed in individual residences); Dresser, supra note 31, at 123–24; see infra notes 58–61 and 
accompanying text (explaining that the devaluation of domestic work is intertwined with discrimina-
tion against women and people of color). Under the FLSA, domestic work refers to “services of a 
household nature performed by an employee in or about a private home (permanent or temporary).” 
29 C.F.R. § 552.3. 
 58 Dresser, supra note 31, at 123–24. The poor treatment and lack of protection for home care 
workers result from disrespect for caregiving, a traditionally female task, and bias against communi-
ties that disproportionally provide these services. Id. 
 59 See Terri Nilliasca, Note, Some Women’s Work: Domestic Work, Class, Race, Heteropatriar-
chy, and the Limits of Legal Reform, 16 MICH. J. RACE & L. 377, 384 (2011) (rooting the devaluation 
of domestic workers in the racist hierarchy of slavery). The “Mammy” trope, which cast Black women 
in the role of caring for white children, is one example of how racism and sexism have intersected to 
shape enduring societal perceptions of domestic work. Id. 
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free of charge has contributed to the denigration of this labor.60 As a result, the 
devaluation of caregiving and the individuals who provide it has shaped legis-
lation concerning the home care industry.61 
Today, women and individuals from Black and Latinx communities dom-
inate home care occupations.62 Nearly ninety percent of home care workers are 
female.63 Moreover, people of color make up approximately two-thirds of the 
direct care workforce, and about a third of the individuals working for home 
care agencies were not born in the United States.64 Ten and a half percent of 
home care agency workers are noncitizens with legal work authorization.65 
Although it remains challenging to accurately assess the number of undocu-
mented individuals working as caregivers, one recent estimate suggests that 
they comprise more than four percent of the direct care workforce.66 
B. Federal Wage and Hour Protections for Home Care Workers 
Despite the inherent opportunities for exploitation in the home care indus-
try, federal wage and hour laws have not always protected home care workers.67 
Congress did not design the FLSA—which establishes a federal minimum 
wage, requires enhanced payment for overtime hours, and sets certain stand-
                                                                                                                           
 60 See Dresser, supra note 31, at 123 (explaining that the devaluation of caregiving is linked to the 
fact that women traditionally performed these services without receiving compensation). 
 61 Nilliasca, supra note 59, at 390–91 (comparing labor laws’ neglect of domestic workers to a 
refusal to protect women of color from their white employers); see Dresser, supra note 31, at 123–24 
(arguing that racism diminishes the social valuation and compensation of home care work). These 
forces combine to create downward pressure on home care workers’ wages. Dresser, supra note 31, at 
124. 
 62 SCALES, supra note 6, at 12 (noting that more than 60% of home care workers are people of 
color); Zallman et al., supra note 9, at 919, 922. 
 63 SCALES, supra note 6, at 11 (stating that 87% of home care workers are women). The pay dif-
ferential within the home care industry puts women of color at a disadvantage when compared to their 
white male counterparts. Id. at 15. One report showed that, on average, women of color working in home 
care made $1.25 less than white male home care workers. Id. (comparing median hourly wages). 
 64 Zallman el al., supra note 9, at 923. The proportion of immigrants working in home care in-
cludes noncitizens with legal status, undocumented individuals, and naturalized U.S. citizens. Id. 
About a quarter of the direct care workers providing services through the informal economy are im-
migrants. Id. at 924. 
 65 Id. at 923–24. Noncitizens with legal work authorization are overrepresented in the home care 
industry relative to their share of the overall U.S. population. See id. (noting that noncitizens with 
legal work authorization comprise about 5% of the total population and a little over 10% of the home 
care agency workforce). 
 66 Id. at 924. Experts estimate that 4.3% of direct care workers lack legal immigration status. Id. 
The proportion of undocumented home care workers working off the books through the gray market 
could be even higher. See id. at 921 (indicating that the study may have underestimated the number of 
informal caregivers and undocumented workers). 
 67 See Home Care Ass’n of Am. v. Weil, 799 F.3d 1084, 1090 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (affirming that the 
DOL could extend FLSA protections to home care employees working for third-party agencies); su-
pra notes 53–55 and accompanying text (emphasizing that home care workers frequently receive 
inadequate compensation and work in challenging circumstances). 
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ards for workplace conditions—with home care in mind.68 Congress enacted 
the FLSA as part of the New Deal to shield vulnerable workers from abuse and 
ensure that they could earn enough money to support themselves and their 
families.69 When the law went into effect during the late 1930s, its protections 
did not extend to domestic workers.70 
In 1974, Congress brought many workers engaged in domestic service un-
der the FLSA’s coverage.71 Despite federal legislators’ efforts to expand the 
scope of labor protections, the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974 (1974 
Amendments) still exempted providers of “companionship services.”72 The DOL 
characterized companionship services as tasks completed to help elderly and 
disabled individuals look after themselves, including cleaning, cooking, and do-
ing laundry.73 Even if home care workers engaged in activities beyond the scope 
of such duties, the exemption still applied if other tasks occupied less than twen-
ty percent of their time.74 As a result, the 1974 Amendments incorporated certain 
domestic workers, such as butlers and gardeners, but left many professional 
home care workers without federal wage and hour protections.75 
                                                                                                                           
 68 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219. Covered employees must receive 
one and a half times their normal rate of pay for hours worked beyond a forty-hour week. Id. 
§ 207(a)(1). The minimum wage mandated for covered employees in the FLSA sets a wage floor, 
currently $7.25 per hour. Id. § 206(a)(1). State and local governments can set a minimum wage above 
the federal limit, as New York City and New York State have done. N.Y. LABOR LAW § 652 (McKin-
ney 2020). The minimum wage in New York City is $15.00 per hour, whereas the minimum wage is 
lower elsewhere in the state. Id. 
 69 Smith, supra note 15, at 1860 (explaining that the purpose of the FLSA was to protect workers 
from exploitation and to make sure they made enough money to meet their basic needs). 
 70 Id. The initial exclusion of domestic workers from the FLSA’s coverage relates to the percep-
tion that labor completed in the home did not demand legal regulation. Lippitt, supra note 31, at 225. 
Additionally, legislators did not believe that domestic workers participated in interstate commerce, 
and were thus beyond the reach of congressional regulation. Smith, supra note 15, at 1860. 
 71 Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, 88 Stat. 55 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.); Smith, supra note 15, at 1860. The Fair Labor Standards 
Amendments of 1974 (1974 Amendments) encompassed domestic workers such as personal chefs, 
private chauffeurs, and housekeepers. Smith, supra note 15, at 1860–61 (citing Domestic Service 
Employment, 29 C.F.R. § 552.3 (2006)). 
 72 Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974 § 7. The motivation behind the 1974 Amendments 
was the extension of protection to individuals working in a home setting. Fowler, supra note 42, at 
110. 
 73 Fowler, supra note 42, at 111 (citing Companionship Services, 29 C.F.R. § 552.6 (2008)). 
 74 29 C.F.R. § 552.6 (2020). Domestic tasks unrelated to caring for the client could account for 
only a small percentage of the worker’s activities each week. Id. The regulation specifically excluded 
tasks that a person with medical expertise would need to provide. Id. 
 75 Smith, supra note 15, at 1860–61. The DOL’s decision to classify home caregiving as domestic 
work enabled courts to apply the companionship services exemption to exclude home care workers 
from the FLSA’s coverage. Id. at 1861. Prior to the agency’s decision to change its approach to the 
companionship exemption in 2015, federal regulations dictated that the carveout for those providing 
companionship extended to caregivers working for agencies. Third Party Employment, 29 C.F.R. 
§ 552.109 (2008); Smith, supra note 15, at 1861. 
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In the wake of the 1974 Amendments, federal courts were asked to con-
sider the companionship services exemption in the context of home care.76 In 
1990, in McCune v. Oregon Senior Services Division, the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit held that home care workers living in their clients’ 
homes could not invoke FLSA protections because they were domestic service 
workers providing companionship services.77 A decade later, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit considered whether the companionship services 
exemption applied to home care employees working for third-party agencies.78 
In 2000, in Johnston v. Volunteers of America, Inc., the Tenth Circuit affirmed 
that the exemption included home care agency employees, despite statutory 
language indicating that it applied only to caregivers working directly for their 
clients.79 Subsequent district court rulings embraced Johnston’s reasoning.80 
The U.S. Supreme Court later considered the applicability of the FLSA 
companionship services exemption to home care workers.81 In 2007, in Long 
                                                                                                                           
 76 McCune v. Or. Senior Servs. Div., 894 F.2d 1107, 1110 (9th Cir. 1990); Smith, supra note 15, 
at 1861–65 (recounting the string of cases litigated to determine whether professional home care ser-
vices fell within the scope of the companionship services exemption); see Lippitt, supra note 31, at 
227 (stating that the companionship services exemption, as outlined in the 1974 Amendments and 
subsequent DOL regulations, applied to a majority of home care workers). 
 77 McCune, 894 F.2d at 1110–11; Smith, supra note 15, at 1861 (describing the holding in McCu-
ne v. Oregon Senior Services Division and explaining that it was the first case to consider the applica-
bility of the companionship services exemption to home care workers). In 1990, in McCune, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit deferred to the DOL’s interpretation of the companionship 
services exemption. 894 F.2d at 1110. The majority rejected the plaintiffs’ contention that the exemp-
tion could apply to companionship service providers working only on a casual basis. Id. Moreover, the 
court held that the plaintiffs did not meet the criteria for exclusion from the exemption as individuals 
with medical training or workers performing normal housekeeping tasks. Id. at 1110–11. The majority 
recommended that the plaintiffs seek a legislative remedy. Id. The majority also expressed concern 
that home care clients would not be able to afford home care if they needed to pay minimum wages. 
Id. at 1110. 
 78 See Johnston v. Volunteers of Am., Inc., 213 F.3d 559, 561 (10th Cir. 2000) (affirming the 
application of the companionship services exemption to the employees of a third-party home care 
agency). 
 79 Id. at 562. The plaintiffs in Johnston v. Volunteers of America, Inc. worked for a third-party 
organization that provided supportive housing to developmentally disabled clients. Id. at 561. The 
plaintiffs sued to recover overtime pay, arguing that the companionship services exemption did not 
apply to them because they worked for their employer instead of their clients. Id. (referring to 29 
C.F.R. § 552.3 (2015)). In 2000, in Johnston, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that 
the exemption could apply to home care workers employed by a third-party organization. Id. at 562. 
Despite this, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s denial of the employer’s motion for sum-
mary judgment because it held that the plaintiffs did not work in individual residences. Id. at 566. 
 80 See id. at 561 (holding that the companionship services exemption could apply to employees of 
third-party organizations); Smith, supra note 15, at 1865 (explaining that later decisions followed the 
same rationale that the Tenth Circuit relied upon in Johnston). 
 81 Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 164 (2007). After an intricate appeals 
history, Long Island Care Home, Ltd. v. Coke reached the U.S. Supreme Court for the second time in 
2007. Id. In 2003, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York initially found in favor 
of the home care agency on the basis of the plaintiff’s complaint, but in 2004, the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit held that the third-party provision was unenforceable and remanded the 
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Island Care at Home v. Coke, the Supreme Court held that the exemption could 
include third-party agency employees.82 The plaintiff, a home care worker with 
an agency employer, sued to recover wages under the FLSA.83 The Court held 
that the DOL had lawfully exercised its discretion when it applied the exemp-
tion to home care employees working for third-party agencies.84 
Mounting concern over the exploitation of home care workers prompted 
the DOL to reassess its interpretation of the companionship services exemption 
and its application to third-party employers in 2011.85 A revised DOL regula-
tion prohibited third-party agencies from invoking the companionship services 
exemption.86 This change extended FLSA protections to home care employees 
working for agencies, even when their clients functioned as joint employers.87 
Thus, the updated regulation permitted caregivers working for third-party 
agencies to enforce their rights to minimum and overtime wages.88 
                                                                                                                           
case. Id. Then in 2006, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Second Circuit following the 
release of a DOL memorandum supporting the application of the companionship exemption to domes-
tic workers with third-party employers. Id. Finally, in 2007, the Supreme Court granted certiorari after 
the Second Circuit once again decided that the third-party employer provision was not enforceable. Id. 
 82 Coke, 551 U.S. at 171. The Supreme Court affirmed the DOL’s power to interpret the compan-
ionship services exemption and corresponding federal regulations. Id. 
 83 Id. at 164. The plaintiff, Evelyn Coke, asserted that the defendant agency, Long Island Care at 
Home, Ltd., owed her money for failing to pay her overtime compensation and minimum wages under 
state and federal laws. Id. She argued that the regulations the DOL utilized to exclude home care 
workers from the FLSA’s protections were not enforceable on multiple grounds. Id. at 166. The plain-
tiff contended that the regulations opposed congressional intent, contained contradictions, and lacked 
the force of law. Id. Moreover, she asserted that the DOL used a deficient process to promulgate these 
standards. Id. 
 84 Id. at 171. The Supreme Court deferred to the DOL under a “plainly erroneous” standard of 
review. Id. The Court held that that the regulations carried legal authority. Id. at 172. Furthermore, the 
Court reasoned that the DOL employed adequate procedures when it promulgated the disputed regula-
tions. Id. at 174–76. 
 85 See Klein & Boris, supra note 38, at 319 (indicating that the Obama administration wanted to 
shift the DOL’s approach to the companionship services exemption). The DOL considered making 
changes to the companionship services exemption several times in the years leading up to the Coke 
decision. 551 U.S. at 163. Proponents of the change contended that Congress formulated the compan-
ionship services exemption for nonprofessional caregivers who had little in common with modern, 
professional home care workers. Noam Scheiber, U.S. Court Reinstates Home Care Pay Rules, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 21, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/22/business/us-court-reinstates-home-care-
pay-rules.html [https://perma.cc/9BG4-E77P]. The DOL defended its new interpretation of the ex-
emption on these grounds. Id. 
 86 See Third Party Employment, 29 C.F.R. § 552.109(a) (2020) (providing that third-party agencies 
cannot use the exemption to avoid paying their employees minimum and overtime wages). The amended 
regulation took effect on January 1, 2015. Id. (listing the amendment’s effective date). The DOL also 
amended its regulations concerning live-in caregivers to ensure that arrangements between employers 
and live-in caregivers accurately reflect the time the latter spends working. Id. § 552.102(b). Live-in 
caregivers must receive minimum wages but are ineligible for overtime pay. Id. § 552.102(a). 
 87 Id. § 552.109(a). Individual families that jointly employ home care workers can still claim the 
companionship services exemption. Id. 
 88 See id. (excluding home care workers who work for third-party agencies from the companion-
ship services exemption). 
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Home care agencies, however, opposed the DOL’s decision to extend 
regulatory protections.89 In 2015, in Home Care Ass’n of America v. Weil, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the DOL’s 
ability to amend and interpret its own regulations.90 The court took the same 
agency-deferential stance that the Supreme Court endorsed in Coke in 2007.91 
The court affirmed that home care agencies could not invoke the companion-
ship services exemption to escape paying minimum wages and providing over-
time compensation.92 The Supreme Court denied the Home Care Association 
of America’s petition for certiorari in 2016.93 
This extension of FLSA coverage to home care providers working for 
third-party agencies created opportunities for these workers to seek redress for 
abuses.94 Aggrieved employees have two avenues to compel FLSA compli-
ance.95 The first option permits workers to file complaints with the DOL’s 
                                                                                                                           
 89 See Home Care Ass’n of Am. v. Weil, 799 F.3d 1084, 1090 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (presenting the 
Home Care Association of America’s arguments against the revised language of the DOL’s regula-
tions). 
 90 Id. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit handles many cases con-
cerning the review of federal administrative agency actions. John G. Roberts, Jr., What Makes the 
D.C. Circuit Different? A Historical View, 92 VA. L. REV. 375, 388–89 (2006). Although plaintiffs 
can sue federal agencies in either the D.C. Circuit or the circuit where the litigant lives, practitioners 
are more likely to choose the D.C. Circuit due to its expertise in the area of administrative law. Id. at 
389. 
 91 Weil, 799 F.3d at 1090. In 2015, in Home Care Ass’n of America v. Weil, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit referred to the Supreme Court’s opinion in Coke, noting 
that the FLSA did not contain language regarding the scope of the companionship services exemption 
with respect to third-party employees. Id. at 1091 (referring to Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. 
Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 168 (2007)). The D.C. Circuit further explained that the head of the DOL pos-
sessed the authority to create a regulation that remedied an omission of this type. Id. The court recog-
nized that the DOL possessed the power to change the exemption and provided an adequate reason for 
doing so. Id. at 1090, 1096–97 (holding that the DOL’s rule fulfilled both parts of the test outlined in 
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984)). 
 92 See id. at 1090 (permitting the DOL to change its approach to the companionship services ex-
emption to offer FLSA protections to employees of third-party home care agencies). 
 93 See Home Care Ass’n of Am. v. Weil, 136 S. Ct. 2506, 2506 (2016) (denying certiorari). 
 94 See Hawkins v. Extended Life HomeCare Ltd., No. 2:18-CV-344, 2019 WL 952737, at *1 
(S.D. Ohio Feb. 17, 2019) (explaining the basis of a home care worker suit for unpaid overtime wag-
es); Williams v. Sweet Home Healthcare, LLC, No. 16-2353, 2018 WL 5885453, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 
9, 2018) (incorporating the plaintiffs’ contention that a home care agency misclassified its workers); 
Clark v. Williamson, No. 1:16cv1413, 2018 WL 1626305, at *1 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 30, 2018) (detailing 
allegations that a home care agency misclassified its home care workers). 
 95 See Hallett, supra note 10, at 105–06 (noting that workers can bring private lawsuits to seek 
damages for FLSA violations or notify a federal or state labor law enforcement agency about abuses); 
Weil & Pyles, supra note 10, at 59 (explaining that employees can file complaints with the DOL to 
trigger investigations). Scholars have suggested that strategic enforcement initiatives could alleviate 
problems with the complaint-centered model. DAVID WEIL, IMPROVING WORKPLACE CONDITIONS 
THROUGH STRATEGIC ENFORCEMENT: A REPORT TO THE WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION 2–3 (2010), 
https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/WHD/legacy/files/strategicEnforcement.pdf [https://perma.cc/
3S8E-53BA] (arguing for the DOL to adopt strategic enforcement programs to root out exploitation). 
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WHD to prompt an investigation and subsequent legal action.96 The second 
option allows employees to privately litigate FLSA claims, individually or on 
behalf of a class of similarly situated employees through the FLSA’s collective 
action provision.97 Eligible employees may “opt-in” to private lawsuits as class 
members following preliminary class certification.98 
Given that both options to pursue FLSA claims require active employee 
participation, fear of retaliation can prevent workers from coming forward 
about violations.99 Employers may threaten to fire workers for filing com-
                                                                                                                           
Strategic enforcement refers to active investigations of target industries in the absence of complaints. 
Id.  
 96 Weil & Pyles, supra note 10, at 59 (describing the importance of the complaint process for 
spurring DOL investigations into FLSA violations); Filing a Complaint with the U.S. Department of 
Labor’s Wage and Hour Division (WHD), WORKER.GOV, https://www.worker.gov/actions/whd-
claim/ [https://perma.cc/ [https://perma.cc/3E9K-WXAA] (listing the steps workers must take to file a 
complaint with the WHD). Workers need to supply their contact information, details about their em-
ployer, and facts about the alleged violation to file a complaint. Filing a Complaint with the U.S. De-
partment of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division (WHD), supra. After collecting this information, a 
worker can file the complaint online or over the phone. Id. The agency then transmits the complaint to 
a local branch of the WHD, and staff follow up with the worker to and determine whether an investi-
gation is warranted. Id. In 2009, the U.S. Government Accountability Office conducted a study where-
in researchers submitted faux complaints to the DOL’s WHD. Hallett, supra note 10, at 106 (citing 
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR: WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION’S 
COMPLAINT INTAKE PROCESSES LEAVE LOW WAGE WORKERS VULNERABLE TO WAGE THEFT 4 
(2009), https://www.gao.gov/assets/130/122107.pdf [https://perma.cc/D57R-KUGJ]) (explaining that 
the DOL does not investigate a large proportion of the complaints it receives). The report noted that 
the DOL botched or completely disregarded 90% of the researchers’ test complaints. Id. (citing U.S. 
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra, at 4). These issues may stem in part from the agency’s con-
stricted resources. See WEIL, supra note 95, at 1 (listing monetary and personnel restrictions as factors 
that impede the DOL’s ability to carry out its work). 
 97 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (allowing plaintiffs to litigate their claims collectively); Llezlie Green 
Coleman, Procedural Hurdles and Thwarted Efficiency: Immigration Relief in Wage and Hour Col-
lective Actions, 16 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1, 16–17 (2013) (elaborating on the procedures governing 
FLSA collective action cases). 
 98 Green Coleman, supra note 97, at 18–19. Courts utilize various evidentiary requirements and 
conceptions of “similarly situated” when deciding whether to certify a collective action. Scott A. Moss 
& Nantiya Ruan, No Longer a Second-Class Class Action: Finding Common Ground in the Debate 
Over Wage Collective Actions with Best Practices for Litigation and Adjudication, 11 FED. CTS. L. 
REV. 27, 35–36 (2019) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)). To qualify as “similarly situated,” workers usual-
ly need to have experienced analogous violations and hold comparable positions to those of the plain-
tiffs. Id. at 35 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)). Despite the widespread utilization of a two-step certifica-
tion process with varied evidentiary requirements that an individual must meet to be a “similarly situ-
ated” worker, neither the FLSA nor Supreme Court caselaw dictate how courts should make these 
determinations. Id. at 41 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)). That could change if the Supreme Court grants 
certiorari to review Scott v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., wherein in 2020, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit rejected the use of regular class action criteria to determine whether workers in 
a FLSA collective action were “similarly situated.” 954 F.3d 502, 522 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting 29 
U.S.C. § 216(b)). 
 99 Catherine K. Ruckelshaus, Labor’s Wage War, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 373, 384–85 (2008). 
Some employers use intimidation to dissuade workers from alerting the DOL to labor law violations. 
Hallett, supra note 10, at 125.  
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plaints or participating in private lawsuits.100 Additionally, workers who lack 
legal immigration status can put themselves at real or perceived risk of depor-
tation by taking action against their employer.101 This may encourage employ-
ers to hire undocumented workers—whom they can exploit by threatening to 
call immigration enforcement authorities.102 
In addition to fears of termination and deportation, other barriers further 
hinder FLSA enforcement in the home care industry.103 One of these challeng-
es is the misclassification of workers as independent contractors rather than 
employees because the FLSA’s coverage does not extend to independent con-
tractors.104 Although small business owners with specific abilities traditionally 
garner the independent contractor designation, employers push to include un-
skilled workers in this category as well.105 Misclassification allows companies 
to save money by avoiding taxes and limiting their liability for discriminatory 
                                                                                                                           
 100 Hallett, supra note 10, at 125; Ruckelshaus, supra note 99, at 384–85. The FLSA bars em-
ployers from engaging in retaliatory termination. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3). Because both methods of 
addressing FLSA violations require workers to take proactive steps to enforce their rights, workers 
may worry that they will put their livelihoods at risk by taking these measures. Ruckelshaus, supra 
note 99, at 384–86. For example, the DOL recently sued a business in Texas that pressured a janitor to 
sign a statement that it had compensated him for unpaid earnings. Steven Greenhouse, More Workers 
Are Claiming ‘Wage Theft,’ N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/01/
business/more-workers-are-claiming-wage-theft.html [https://perma.cc/N48M-RH4F]. When the jani-
tor declined to sign the document because he had not received the money, the company terminated 
him. Id. 
 101 Hallett, supra note 10, at 107, 132; Ruckelshaus, supra note 99, at 385. Prior to 2016, the U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) infrequently followed up on calls concerning the legal 
status of workers cooperating with the DOL to address violations. Hallett, supra note 10, at 132. Since 
then, ICE has demonstrated willingness to detain undocumented individuals who are collaborating 
with the DOL. Id. DOL staff indicate that this threat is prompting those without legal status to decline 
to move forward with investigations. Id.  
 102 See Kati L. Griffith, U.S. Migrant Worker Law: The Interstices of Immigration Law and Labor 
and Employment Law, 31 COMPAR. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 125, 140 (2009) (suggesting that companies 
profit by employing workers who are unlikely to report wage theft to the DOL); Hallett, supra note 
10, at 125 (suggesting that enforcement agencies’ reliance on worker complaints incentivizes busi-
nesses to use workers, such as immigrants with limited English proficiency, that are unlikely to come 
forward about abuses). 
 103 See Hallett, supra note 10, at 105–07 (elaborating on the challenges that low-wage workers, 
particularly undocumented individuals, encounter when attempting to address wage theft). 
 104 NELP: NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT, supra note 13, at 1–2 (highlighting misclassification as a 
widespread problem in the home care industry); Hallett, supra note 10, at 98; John A. Pearce II & 
Jonathan P. Silva, The Future of Independent Contractors and Their Status as Non-Employees: Mov-
ing on from a Common Law Standard, 14 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 1, 13 (2018) (explaining that FLSA 
protections only apply to employees because Congress considered them to be more susceptible to 
exploitation). 
 105 Pearce & Silva, supra note 104, at 12–13 (describing the types of workers that traditionally 
qualified as independent contractors). 
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acts.106 The home care industry is one of many fields experiencing frequent 
instances of misclassification.107 
For the purposes of the FLSA, courts utilize a six-part economic realities 
test to determine whether a worker qualifies as an employee or an independent 
contractor.108 The inquiry centers on the extent to which the worker operates as 
an independent enterprise.109 A court will consider whether the worker’s ser-
vices are central to the hiring business’s operations, the timeframe of the work-
ing relationship, and which party pays for tools or other materials.110 The court 
will also weigh other factors, including the level of expertise the services de-
mand, the amount of control the hiring enterprise has over the worker, and the 
extent to which the worker’s choices determine their ability to turn a profit.111 
This analysis requires consideration of every factor, and a contractual agree-
ment that designates the worker as an independent contractor does not settle 
the issue.112 
                                                                                                                           
 106 See Anna Deknatel & Lauren Hoff-Downing, ABC on the Books and in the Courts: An Analy-
sis of Recent Independent Contractor and Misclassification Statutes, 18 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 
53, 54–55 (2015) (recounting the economic incentives for businesses to misclassify their employees as 
independent contractors, including dodging liability for discriminatory activities); Rebecca Smith & 
Catherine Ruckelshaus, Solutions, Not Scapegoats: Abating Sweatshop Conditions for All Low-Wage 
Workers, 10 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 555, 562 (2007) (noting that enterprises that classify 
their workers as independent contractors do not need to furnish certain taxes). 
 107 Pearce & Silva, supra note 104, at 13. Other fields experiencing high levels of misclassifica-
tion include those that offer cleaning services and provide meals. Id. Worker misclassification has 
followed the expansion of the “fissured workplace,” which describes companies that outsource or 
contract with other firms to perform services that they once completed in-house. David Weil, How to 
Make Employment Fair in an Age of Contracting and Temp Work, HARV. BUS. REV. (Mar. 24, 2017), 
https://hbr.org/2017/03/making-employment-a-fair-deal-in-the-age-of-contracting-subcontracting-and-
temp-work [https://perma.cc/XY2P-QUCG]. Moreover, businesses’ ability to misclassify workers 
with impunity likely empowers this trend. See Deknatel & Hoff-Downing, supra note 106, at 55 (not-
ing that a lack of oversight probably contributes to misclassification). 
 108 See Acosta v. Heart II Heart, LLC, No. 2:17-cv-1242, 2019 WL 5197329, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 
15, 2019) (outlining the six-factor economic realities test that courts use to determine whether under 
the FLSA, a worker is an independent contractor or employee). 
 109 Id. The economic realities test details factors that suggest that a worker functions as an inde-
pendent contractor, including: possessing a high skill level for services provided, having flexibility to set 
one’s own schedule, and purchasing a vehicle to visit clients. Id. In contrast, factors that weigh in favor of 
employee classification include: a contract of unlimited duration, supervision requirements, and an ina-
bility to serve clients outside of those that the hiring company provides. Id. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. Unlike employees, independent contractors exercise considerable control over things like 
their rate of pay and the scheduling of their work. David Weil, Lots of Employees Get Misclassified as 
Independent Contractors. Here’s Why It Matters, HARV. BUS. REV. (July. 5, 2017), https://hbr.org/
2017/07/lots-of-employees-get-misclassified-as-contractors-heres-why-it-matters [https://perma.cc/
6YUP-VE78]. The degree of autonomy independent contractors enjoy means that their decisions af-
fect their ability to earn money. Id. 
 112 Acosta, 2019 WL 5197329, at *5. The economic realities test attempts to illustrate how finan-
cially reliant the worker is on the hiring entity. Griffin Toronjo Pivateau, The Prism of Entrepreneur-
ship: Creating a New Lens for Worker Classification, 70 BAYLOR L. REV. 595, 612 (2018). Addition-
ally, application of the economic realities test differs among circuit courts, and courts may consider 
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C. Immigration Law and the Home Care Industry 
Due to the high proportion of foreign-born individuals working in the 
home care industry, immigration law directly impacts the composition of the 
caregiving workforce.113 Congress originally passed the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act (INA) in 1952 to consolidate the country’s immigration laws, in-
cluding those that governed employment-based immigration.114 Furthermore, the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) prohibits the employment 
of individuals without legal work authorization.115 Subsection 1 describes the 
INA and the visa programs that allow foreign nationals to permanently or tempo-
rarily secure work authorization and residency in the United States.116 Subsec-
tion 2 discusses the IRCA and its effects on the home care industry.117 
1. Immigrant and Nonimmigrant Visas Linked to Employment Under the INA 
None of the existing visa categories outlined in the INA provide a viable 
means for a significant number of prospective immigrants to enter the home 
care industry.118 The United States issues only a small number of immigrant 
employment-based visas on an annual basis to allow noncitizens to obtain 
permanent residency.119 The INA establishes a hierarchy of preference for ap-
plicants based on their specific skills and abilities.120 Of the five groups, the 
highest priority attaches to remarkably educated individuals and those with 
exceptional talent.121 This category, known as EB-1, is comprised of foreign-
born individuals who exhibit “extraordinary ability.”122 The next group, EB-2, 
                                                                                                                           
factors beyond those listed in the six-part test. Id. at 617–18. Historically, courts have generally con-
strued the economic realities test to bring more workers under the FLSA’s protections. Id. at 613. 
 113 See Zallman el al., supra note 9, at 924–25 (highlighting the outsize contribution that immi-
grants make to caring for U.S. citizens, and stressing that immigration policy dictates who can take 
these positions). 
 114 Immigration and Nationality Act, 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 8 U.S.C.); Griffith, supra note 102, at 129. 
 115 Immigration Control and Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
 116 See infra notes 118–142 and accompanying text. 
 117 See infra notes 144–158 and accompanying text. 
 118 Rasalam, supra note 17, at 427. 
 119 8 U.S.C. § 1153. Many of the employment-based visa categories include statutory restrictions 
on the number of visas that the United States can issue each year. Id. § 1153(b). These caps may de-
crease in accordance with country-specific limitations found elsewhere in the code. Id. § 1152. 
 120 Id. § 1153(b)(1)–(5) (introducing the five levels of preference for immigrant employment-
based visas).  
 121 Id. § 1153(b)(1); Scalzo, supra note 17, at 930–31 (explaining that the INA prioritizes visa 
allocation to individuals with special skills and outstanding educational accomplishments). 
 122 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(1); see Scalzo, supra note 17, at 931 (describing the rigorous criteria for 
EB-1 priority status). 
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demands a significant level of professional and educational achievement in a 
particular field.123 
Home care workers fall into EB-3, the tier with the third highest level of 
preference.124 This group encompasses individuals who perform skilled or un-
skilled work.125 Within this category, applicants with specialized capabilities 
have an edge over those who lack specific skills.126 The INA limits EB-3 visa 
allocation to 10,000 per year for unskilled applicants.127 Because home care 
does not require a post-secondary degree or advanced training, most home care 
workers are considered unskilled workers for the purposes of the EB-3 visa.128 
The INA’s strict cap on EB-3 visa allocation to unskilled workers makes it 
difficult for would-be caregivers to enter the United States with this type of 
visa.129 
In addition to immigrant employment-based visas, the INA provides for 
the issuance of temporary nonimmigrant visas to workers.130 The law refers to 
these individuals as “nonimmigrants.”131 One program offers H-1B visas, 
which provide temporary work authorization to individuals with specialized 
skills, primarily in scientific and technological fields.132 H-1B visas offer 
greater flexibility than many other temporary visas because they come with an 
opportunity to obtain citizenship.133 Furthermore, once H-1B visa holders ar-
                                                                                                                           
 123 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2)(A); Scalzo, supra note 17, at 933. 
 124 See Scalzo, supra note 17, at 935 (noting that the EB-3 category includes unskilled workers, 
which would encompass home care workers). 
 125 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3); Scalzo, supra note 17, at 934–35. 
 126 8 U.S.C § 1153(b)(3)(B); see Scalzo, supra note 17, at 935 (remarking on the 10,000 visa cap 
on unskilled workers and lengthy wait times for applicants). 
 127 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(B). This limitation has created an extensive waitlist, especially for appli-
cants from certain countries. See id. § 1152(a)(2) (capping familial and employment-based visas avail-
able to applicants from any individual nation at 7% per year); Scalzo, supra note 17, at 935. Although 
two other categories of EB visas exist, both are highly specific and benefit fairly small numbers of immi-
grants. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(4)–(5) (outlining requirements for EB-4 and 4B-5 immigrant employ-
ment-based visas). EB-4 visas are available to very limited populations, including some religious 
workers and former employees of the Panama Canal Company. Id. § 1153(b)(4) (citing 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(27)). Foreign investors who meet certain criteria can apply for EB-5 visas. Id. § 1153(b)(5). 
 128 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3) (grouping unskilled workers under the EB-3 visa program). 
 129 Rasalam, supra note 17, at 427. 
 130 8 U.S.C. § 1184 (outlining the visa programs available to nonimmigrant applicants). 
 131 Id. § 1101(a)(15) (distinguishing nonimmigrants from immigrants); Griffith, supra note 102, 
at 130. 
 132 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b); Special Requirements for Admission, Extension, and Mainte-
nance of Status, 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h) (2020); see Griffith, supra note 102, at 131 (defining the H-1B 
visa program and its selection criteria). An employer needs to apply on behalf of a nonimmigrant to 
receive this type of visa. Griffith, supra note 102, at 132. The statute caps H-1B visas at 65,000 per year. 
8 U.S.C.A. § 1184(g)(1)(A) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-188). Limited exceptions, however, do 
exist for those working in higher education or for certain nonprofits, and for individuals with graduate 
degrees from U.S. universities. Id. § 1184(g)(5). 
 133 See Griffith, supra note 102, at 131–32 (noting that the H-1B visa program permits adjustment 
of immigration status and employer portability). The government typically issues these visas for three 
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rive in the United States, they can switch employers while retaining their work 
authorization.134 Home care workers are not eligible for H-1B visas because 
they do not meet the education or training criteria necessary to qualify.135 
Additionally, the INA authorizes the H-2 visa program for nonimmigrants 
without specific capabilities or training.136 Agricultural laborers may receive 
H-2A visas, and unskilled seasonal workers in other fields can obtain H-2B 
visas.137 The duration of both H-2 visas is typically up to one year, and indi-
viduals can apply to extend their stay for a maximum of only three years.138 H-
2 visa holders cannot adjust their status to get permanent residency.139 Fur-
thermore, these individuals cannot change employers for the duration of their 
stay in the United States.140 Although home care workers qualify as unskilled 
laborers, they do not meet the seasonal work requirement for H-2 visas.141 
Therefore, individuals who wish to work in the home care industry have few 
options under the INA.142 
2. Prohibition on Hiring Undocumented Workers Under the IRCA 
Given the paucity of legal avenues for unskilled workers to enter the United 
States, undocumented individuals tend to work as informal caregivers.143 Fur-
                                                                                                                           
years with the option to renew for an additional three years. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1184(g)(4); Griffith, supra 
note 102, at 131. Moreover, H-1B visa holders can adjust their status to become permanent residents 
with support from their employers. Griffith, supra note 102, at 132. 
 134 Griffith, supra note 102, at 132. Although this feature allows for additional opportunities, some 
workers find it challenging to locate a new employer. Id. 
 135 Rasalam, supra note 17, at 427 (explaining that no existing visa category presents a means for 
eldercare workers to legally work in the United States). 
 136 Griffith, supra note 102, at 134. 
 137 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h) (specifying which workers can receive H-2A and H-2B visas); Griffith, 
supra note 102, at 134. The statute does not institute a cap for H-2A visas, but the number of H-2B visas 
is limited to 66,000 each year. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1184(g)(1)(B); Griffith, supra note 114, at 135. 
 138 Griffith, supra note 114, at 135. It tends to be difficult for workers with H-2 visas to prolong 
their stays in the United States. See id. (noting that the DOL rarely approves requests to extend H-2 
visas). 
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. 
 141 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(1)(i) (limiting H-2 visa allocation to those performing agricultural or 
short-term work); Rasalam, supra note 17, at 427. 
 142 See Rasalam, supra note 17, at 427 (asserting that there are very few ways for unskilled work-
ers from other countries to obtain employment-based visas). The INA authorizes other types of immi-
grant visas, including those that require applicants to have a citizen family member, gain asylum, or 
show that they were a victim of certain crimes. 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1153, 1158, 1184. Another avenue for 
obtaining permanent residency is the Diversity Immigrant Visa Program, a program that awards a 
limited number of green cards to people from specific countries. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(c). 
 143 See Immigration Control and Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.) (barring employers from hiring undocumented 
individuals); HESS & HENRICI, supra note 21, at 13 (suggesting that approximately one fifth of work-
ers providing direct care services are undocumented and indicating that the proportion could be larg-
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thermore, undocumented immigrants are less likely to enforce their rights un-
der the FLSA due to fear of retribution or government scrutiny, which leaves 
them more vulnerable to exploitation than individuals with legal work authori-
zation.144 Recent estimates indicate that the total number of undocumented 
immigrants residing in the United States hovers somewhere between ten and 
twelve million.145 It is challenging to gauge the size of the undocumented 
home care workforce because of the difficulties in measuring informal eco-
nomic activity.146 One recent study suggests that a little over four percent of 
direct care workers lack documentation.147 
Immigration and labor law intertwined in 1986 when Congress sought to 
discourage illegal immigration by enacting the IRCA.148 The law requires em-
ployers to verify that their employees possess legal authorization to work in 
the United States by filing an I-9 form or utilizing an e-verification database.149 
The IRCA imposes civil penalties, and in some cases criminal sanctions, on 
employers that knowingly hire individuals without proper documentation.150 
                                                                                                                           
er); Span, supra note 50 (noting that more immigrants might work informally in the home care sector 
than estimates show). 
 144 Griffith, supra note 102, at 140. 
 145 See HESS & HENRICI, supra note 21, at 13 (indicating that there were eleven to twelve million 
undocumented people in the U.S. as of 2012); Jeffery S. Passel & D’vera Cohn, Mexicans Decline to 
Less Than Half the U.S. Unauthorized Immigrant Population for the First Time, PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 
12, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/06/12/us-unauthorized-immigrant-population-
2017/ [https://perma.cc/UY4K-MF45] (estimating that there were 10.5 million unauthorized immi-
grants living in the United States in 2017). But see Mohammad M. Fazel-Zarandi et al., The Number 
of Undocumented Immigrants in the United States: Estimates Based on Demographic Modeling with 
Data from 1990 to 2016, PLOS ONE, Sept. 2018, at 1 (speculating that previous studies tended to un-
derestimate the United States’ undocumented population and positing that an accurate estimation is 
approximately 22.1 million people). 
 146 HESS & HENRICI, supra note 21, at 13; Zallman et al., supra note 9, at 921. Gray market trans-
actions occur outside of legal channels, which renders them hard to track. See Smith Nightingale & 
Wandner, supra note 46, at 4 (detailing the challenges of quantifying the informal economy). Addi-
tionally, undocumented individuals working in the United States may avoid participating in surveys to 
evade detection. Zallman et al., supra note 9, at 921. 
 147 Zallman et al., supra note 9, at 924. 
 148 Immigration Control and Reform Act of 1986, 100 Stat. 3359. 
 149 8 U.S.C. § 1324a. An employer must review official materials, such as a passport, that affirm 
an applicant’s identity and work authorization status. Id. § 1324a(b). Additionally, employers need to 
sign a form to swear that the applicant can legally work in the United States. Id. States are now requir-
ing more employers to use e-verification to confirm the status of their employees. Catalina Amuedo-
Dorantes & Cynthia Bansak, The Labor Market Impact of Mandated Employment Verification Sys-
tems, 102 AM. ECON. REV.: PAPERS & PROC. 543, 543 (2012). This increased use of online tracking 
systems may compel more undocumented individuals, particularly women, to enter fields that are 
exempt from e-verification requirements. Id. at 546. 
 150 8 U.S.C. § 1324a; Griffith, supra note 102, at 139. Employers that repeatedly violate the Im-
migration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) may need to pay a $3,000 fine for each person for 
whom the employer committed an infraction and/or spend a maximum of six months in prison for 
their actions. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(f)(1). 
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Although most IRCA penalties apply solely to employers, a 1990 
amendment to the INA sanctioned undocumented workers who utilize falsified 
forms to obtain employment.151 Foreign-born individuals who engage in fraud 
to get positions that fall within the IRCA’s purview can be subject to civil 
fines and even criminal prosecution.152 Nevertheless, the IRCA does not penal-
ize undocumented individuals for searching for jobs or functioning as employ-
ees.153 Moreover, the statute does not apply to workers designated as inde-
pendent contractors.154 
Given that the IRCA’s coverage is limited to employees, its provisions do 
not apply to every person working in the home care industry.155 There is no 
indication that families hiring home care workers through the gray market veri-
fy their work authorization status.156 Additionally, the IRCA does not restrict 
home care agencies from engaging undocumented caregivers as independent 
contractors.157 Therefore, the IRCA by design encourages undocumented indi-
viduals to remain in underregulated positions and avoid reporting abuses.158 
II. THE EXISTING LEGAL FRAMEWORK HARMS HOME CARE  
WORKERS AND DEMANDS A SOLUTION 
The impending shortage of home care workers threatens to leave elderly 
and disabled individuals without the services they need to remain in their 
communities.159 The mere extension of FLSA coverage to some home care 
                                                                                                                           
 151 8 U.S.C. § 1324c; Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.); Griffith, supra note 102, at 140. 
 152 8 U.S.C. § 1324c. Fines for violations of this statute range from $250 to $5,000 per document 
for repeat offenders. Id. § 1324c(d)(3). Criminal penalties may apply to individuals or entities that 
hide their involvement in creating fraudulent applications. Id. § 1324c(e). 
 153 Griffith, supra note 102, at 140. An undocumented immigrant who has not engaged in fraudu-
lent activity will not be subject to penalties under the IRCA solely for taking a job. Id. 
 154 See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (omitting any reference to independent contractors). 
 155 Id. § 1324a; see Zallman et al., supra note 9, at 919–20 (suggesting that there are many indi-
viduals working in the informal sector as home care workers). 
 156 See Dresser, supra note 31, at 119 (describing the lack of regulation that accompanies the “off 
the books” nature of informal home care work). Although in theory the IRCA applies to any person or 
entity that hires an employee, the gray market comprises informal arrangements wherein workers 
receive payment under-the-table. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a; Dresser, supra note 31, at 119. It is therefore 
improbable that employers would comply with these requirements. See Dresser, supra note 31, at 119 
(indicating that informal home care employment operates outside the law). 
 157 Griffith, supra note 102, at 140. 
 158 Id. Scholars have speculated that the implementation of the IRCA helped entrench undocu-
mented immigrants in the informal economy. Id. Furthermore, it provided employers with a powerful 
tool to prevent workers from complaining about labor law violations. Id. 
 159 See Zallman et al., supra note 9, at 920 (citing NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH WORKFORCE ANALY-
SIS, supra note 45, at 1) (speculating that there will be a large shortfall of direct care workers if poli-
cies do not change). One recent report estimates that there will be 4.7 million jobs available in the 
home care industry within the next ten years. SCALES, supra note 6, at 17. 
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workers has not made their work more desirable.160 Moreover, current visa pro-
grams put noncitizens who wish to work in the industry at a disadvantage.161 
Recognition of these problems has prompted various stakeholders to propose 
policy improvements for the home care industry.162 Section A of this Part dis-
cusses how inadequate enforcement limits the reach of FLSA protections in the 
home care context.163 Section B discusses the lack of avenues available to pro-
spective immigrants who wish to obtain lawful employment as caregivers.164 
Section C surveys policy proposals that aim to address problems in the home 
care industry.165 
A. The Extension of FLSA Coverage to Home Care Workers  
Remains Limited 
After the DOL changed its stance on the companionship services exemp-
tion in 2015, third-party home care agencies had to comply with the FLSA’s 
wage and hour protections.166 Nevertheless, if home care workers cannot suc-
cessfully enforce their rights, the extension of FLSA coverage is unlikely to 
have a practical impact.167 Similarly, ongoing efforts to raise the minimum 
wage at the federal and state levels will not assist home care workers if they 
cannot address labor violations and assert pay equity.168 Subsection 1 of this 
                                                                                                                           
 160 See SCALES, supra note 6, at 17 (describing the problems with high turnover in the field); 
Dresser, supra note 31, at 117–18 (describing low pay and demanding work as undesirable aspects of 
home care work). 
 161 Rasalam, supra note 17, at 427 (articulating that visas linked to employment do not provide 
prospective home care workers with viable options). 
 162 See generally Direct CARE Opportunity Act, S. 2521, 116th Cong. (2019) (illustrating a fed-
eral legislative approach to the crisis); HESS & HENRICI, supra note 21, at 21 (representing a policy 
organization’s response to issues involved in caregiving); Why It Matters?, supra note 20 (exemplify-
ing a union’s efforts to organize home care providers). 
 163 See infra notes 166–201 and accompanying text. 
 164 See infra notes 202–219 and accompanying text. 
 165 See infra notes 220–239 and accompanying text. 
 166 See Home Care Ass’n of Am. v. Weil, 799 F.3d 1084, 1090 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Companionship 
Services, 29 C.F.R. § 552.109 (2020) (embodying the DOL’s revised companionship services exemp-
tion). 
 167 See Hallett, supra note 10, at 104–05 (explaining that the employee-driven complaint system 
prevents workers from asserting their rights, which leaves them vulnerable to continued exploitation); 
Ruckelshaus, supra note 99, at 386–87, 392 (elaborating on the challenges the FLSA’s “opt-in” col-
lective action mechanism has for low-wage and immigrant workers). Despite the DOL’s increased use 
of proactive investigations to address FLSA violations, the agency still relied on complaints to initiate 
a large proportion of its investigations in 2017. Weil, supra note 11, at 5 (noting that the DOL initiat-
ed more than half of its investigations without receiving a worker complaint in 2017). 
 168 See Ruckelshaus, supra note 99, at 375 (arguing that employers will not have incentives to 
change their conduct if they can violate labor laws without any consequences). If new laws require 
wages to increase without addressing weak legal mechanisms to compel enforcement, the mere exist-
ence of these laws will not help workers. See id. at 388–90 (illustrating the pervasiveness of wage 
theft under the existing system). 
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Section considers the failings of employee-driven enforcement mechanisms in 
the home care context.169 Subsection 2 discusses how worker misclassification 
limits home care workers’ ability to enforce their rights.170 
1. Employee-Driven Enforcement Mechanisms 
Unique features of the home care industry make it especially challenging 
for home care workers to report FLSA violations to the DOL’s WHD or bring 
private lawsuits to recover unpaid wages.171 These difficulties may contribute 
to frequent turnover and subpar conditions that plague the industry.172 Alt-
hough home care employees possess two avenues for litigating FLSA claims, 
the workforce’s demography and socioeconomic status make these options ill-
suited to root out labor law violations in the industry.173 
The first FLSA enforcement mechanism requires employees to report vio-
lations directly to the DOL, posing several challenges for home care work-
ers.174 Initially, the complaint process demands disclosure of personal infor-
mation.175 This could be daunting for home care workers, many of whom come 
                                                                                                                           
 169 See infra notes 171–190 and accompanying text. 
 170 See infra notes 191–201 and accompanying text. 
 171 See Hallett, supra note 10, at 104–05 (outlining barriers low-income and immigrant workers 
face to filing complaints with the DOL or litigating FLSA claims); Ruckelshaus, supra note 99, at 
385–86 (detailing why it is hard for workers to participate in FLSA collective action lawsuits). 
 172 See SCALES, supra note 6, at 19 (linking retention problems in the home care industry to poor 
job quality). 
 173 See Janice Fine & Jennifer Gordon, Strengthening Labor Standards Enforcement Through 
Partnerships with Workers’ Organizations, 38 POL. & SOC’Y 552, 555 (2010) (highlighting the chal-
lenges that low-wage workers face under the current enforcement framework); Hallett, supra note 10, 
at 104–05 (explaining that most workers who experience wage theft do not file complaints with the 
DOL); infra notes 174–185 and accompanying text (discussing the two enforcement mechanisms 
available to workers entitled to FLSA protections). Some home care workers, including those properly 
classified as independent contractors and those working directly for their clients through the gray 
market, would still not enjoy protection under the FLSA. See Companionship Services, 29 C.F.R. 
§ 552.109(a) (2020) (allowing individuals who directly employ home care workers to claim the com-
panionship services exemption); Pearce & Silva, supra note 104, at 13 (explaining that independent 
contractors do not enjoy labor law protections). Given that home care workers tend to be immigrants 
and women of color who do not earn much money, enforcement mechanisms that depend on worker 
initiation are likely to be particularly problematic for this population. Zallman et al., supra note 9, at 
922–23. (laying out the demographics of home care workers); see Hallett, supra note 10, at 99 (ex-
plaining that the majority of indigent laborers experience wage theft and noting that marginalized 
groups are most susceptible to it). 
 174 Weil & Pyles, supra note 10, at 59. In 2017, the DOL conducted more than half of its investi-
gations without a complaint, but still depended on complaints for a significant percentage of inquiries. 
Weil, supra note 11, at 5. 
 175 See supra note 96 and accompanying text (noting that workers must provide their contact 
information and details about the alleged violations they have experienced to file a complaint with the 
DOL’s WHD). 
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from marginalized communities, due to distrust.176 Furthermore, few home 
care workers belong to unions that can support them during the complaint pro-
cess.177 Home care workers are also unlikely to have time to participate in the 
investigative process or in enforcement proceedings.178 Lastly, home care 
workers might be completely unaware of their legal rights.179 
The second enforcement mechanism permits home care workers to file 
private lawsuits against their employers, but this avenue for redress has similar 
problems.180 The “opt-in” mechanism outlined in the FLSA’s collective action 
provision requires workers who join private lawsuits to actively participate in 
the litigation.181 This means that a home care worker could easily disregard the 
notice to join a suit or misunderstand its meaning, thus losing an opportunity to 
assert their rights.182 Moreover, home care workers may lack the financial re-
sources to participate in litigation.183 Many home care workers make so little 
money that they cannot afford to survive without government assistance, let 
                                                                                                                           
 176 See Fine, supra note 12, at 152 (indicating that undocumented workers and people of color 
may be more hesitant to lodge complaints with governmental enforcement agencies); supra notes 63–
65 and accompanying text (explaining that a majority of home care workers are women of color and 
immigrants). 
 177 See Hallett, supra note 10, at 139 (identifying the low proportion of unionization in fields 
where violations often occur as a barrier to FLSA enforcement). In 2019, approximately 6% of work-
ers in “[p]ersonal care and service occupations” and 7% of workers in “[h]ealthcare support occupa-
tions” claimed to be members of a union. Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, 
U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT., https://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat42.htm [https://perma.cc/8P2X-MVFE] 
(Jan. 22, 2020). Workers who are not union members are less likely to assert their rights under labor 
laws than those who are members. Ruckelshaus, supra note 99, at 384. 
 178 See Hallett, supra note 10, at 107 (noting that workers who make little money are less likely to 
have room in their schedules to seek redress for reprisals); Lippitt, supra note 31, at 222 (highlighting 
the fact that many home care workers spend significant amounts of time working). 
 179 See Hallett, supra note 10, at 105 (explaining that most low-wage workers do not know about 
their rights under state wage and hour laws). Workers who do not speak English experience more 
trouble accessing this information, which is of particular consequence for home care workers because 
a third of home care agency employees are immigrants. Id.; Zallman et al., supra note 9, at 924. 
 180 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); Griffith, supra note 102, at 147 (articulating that workers without legal 
work authorization can bring private lawsuits for FLSA claims); see Hallett, supra note 10, at 105–06 
(describing the reasons why litigation is a challenging enforcement mechanism for laborers such as 
home care workers). 
 181 See Coleman, supra note 97, at 18–19 (explaining that putative class members receive notice 
regarding the lawsuit and that they can choose not to participate in the class action). 
 182 Id. at 19–20. Two reasons why a worker may not “opt-in” to a FLSA collective action include 
language barriers that preclude understanding the notice, and concerns that the suit notice is illegiti-
mate. Id. The demographic composition of the home care work force suggests that these issues could 
be particularly problematic for professional caregivers. See Zallman et al., supra note 9, at 923–24 
(illustrating the high proportion of immigrations and individuals from marginalized communities 
working in the home care industry). These issues might help explain why the “opt-out” system for 
traditional class action lawsuits tends to produce larger classes than the “opt-in” mechanism for the 
FLSA collective action. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B); Coleman, supra note 97, at 19. 
 183 See Hallett, supra note 10, at 105–06 (discussing the challenges low-wage workers face when 
suing to recover unpaid wages). 
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alone pay an attorney or take time off.184 Although some nonprofits provide 
representation to low-wage workers free of charge, legal aid organizations that 
receive federal funding cannot assist undocumented immigrants under most 
circumstances.185 
Moreover, citizen and noncitizen home care workers may fear retaliation 
from their employers if they complain to the DOL or file a lawsuit to address 
violations.186 If an employer fires a home care worker for coming forward, the 
worker may lack the time or means to litigate a wrongful termination claim.187 
In addition to worrying about retaliatory firing, immigrant home care workers 
may fear that speaking up will result in deportation.188 Undocumented workers 
are particularly vulnerable to threats that their employer will contact immigra-
tion authorities if they report FLSA violations.189 Furthermore, concern about 
reprisal can prevent immigrant workers from opting into FLSA collective ac-
tion lawsuits even when other employees initiated the litigation.190 
                                                                                                                           
 184 See id. (explaining that many workers earn too little to pay for private counsel). Some attor-
neys will litigate FLSA claims on a contingency basis. Id. at 105. Still, indigent workers encounter 
difficulty retaining these lawyers because they are unlikely to win large damage awards in their cases. 
Id. This makes their cases unattractive to lawyers who would recover only part of the award as pay-
ment. See id. (indicating that lawyers are more likely to represent employees with high salaries). 
 185 See Smith & Ruckelshaus, supra note 106, at 593 (noting that organizations that receive Legal 
Services Corporation funding from the federal government cannot assist undocumented individuals). 
Workers who have FLSA claims face the additional challenge of finding an organization that will take 
their case because most focus on issues like unemployment compensation as opposed to wage theft. 
Hallett, supra note 10, at 106. 
 186 Hallett, supra note 10, at 107. A 2009 study found that over 40% workers who came forward 
about workplace violations experienced reprisals. Id. 
 187 Id. (explaining that many low-wage workers who endure retaliation lack the time or resources 
to seek damages); Occupational Employment and Wages, May 2019, supra note 52 (illustrating that 
home care workers make less than $15 per hour on average).  
 188 Ruckelshaus, supra note 99, at 384–85 (describing the types of retaliation employers use to 
silence their workers and highlighting a situation where ICE targeted immigrant workers). One high 
profile example of employer retaliation came to light when the New York Attorney General’s Office 
issued a press release concerning a home care agency’s failure to pay 100 workers in accordance with 
state wage and hour laws in 2019. Press Release, Letitia James, N.Y. Att’y Gen., Attorney General 
James Secures $450,000 for 100 Home Health Aides Threatened with Deportation (Sept. 13, 2019), 
https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2019/attorney-general-james-secures-450000-100-home-health-aides-
threatened [https://perma.cc/NJ3U-W8Z4]. In addition to remedying wage theft, a portion of the 
$450,000 payout compensated immigrants whom the agency intimidated by threatening to call immi-
gration enforcement authorities. Id. 
 189 See supra note 101 and accompanying text (describing ICE’s recent move to target undocu-
mented workers who report labor violations and suggesting that this made individuals without work 
authorization less likely to come forward about abuses).  
 190 Coleman, supra note 97, at 19–20. Workers may worry that their employers will contact im-
migration enforcement authorities in response to undocumented employee involvement in a lawsuit. 
Id. Moreover, immigrants without legal status may be more hesitant to appear before a court and testi-
fy against their employers. See id. at 19 (suggesting that trepidation at the prospect of addressing vio-
lations in court might deter undocumented immigrants from opting into collective action classes). 
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2. Misclassification in the Home Care Industry 
The escalation of worker misclassification by the home care industry pre-
sents an additional challenge to FLSA enforcement.191 Home care workers des-
ignated as independent contractors do not enjoy any protections under the 
FLSA.192 Even though home care work, which requires little to no formal 
training, does not fit into the traditional conceptualization of independent con-
tractor status, some workers are classified as such.193 Under the FLSA’s six-
factor economic realities test, many of the features that characterize caregiving 
in the home weigh in favor of employee status.194 Still, some third-party agen-
cies misclassify their home care workers as independent contractors to evade 
regulatory oversight.195 Since 2015, the DOL and individual home care work-
ers have taken legal action against agencies for failure to pay overtime and 
minimum wages due to misclassification.196 
Worker misclassification could further exacerbate existing FLSA en-
forcement obstacles because misclassified home care workers are unlikely to 
understand their rights under the FLSA.197 The FLSA does not require busi-
                                                                                                                           
 191 See Ruckelshaus, supra note 99, at 381 (listing the home care industry as one of the fields 
experiencing increased instances of worker misclassification). 
 192 Id. at 380. Congress did not believe that independent contractors needed to be covered under 
labor laws when it enacted the FLSA in 1938. Pearce & Silva, supra note 104, at 13. Businesses start-
ed classifying unskilled workers, such as home care workers, as independent contractors in recent 
years. Id. Worker misclassification benefits companies because it reduces their labor expenses and tax 
burden. Deknatel & Hoff-Downing, supra note 106, at 55. 
 193 Pearce & Silva, supra note 104, at 12–13 (stating that independent contractors are often small 
business operators with a high degree of skill). Nearly half of home care workers lack advanced de-
grees. Zallman et al., supra note 9, at 923. Although requirements vary by state and depend on a 
workers’ duties, many home care workers do not need significant training to provide caregiving ser-
vices. See Condition of Participation: Home Health Aide Services, 42 C.F.R. § 484.80 (2020) (requir-
ing “home health aides” working for agencies funded through government-sponsored health insurance 
programs to receive seventy-five hours of training); Personal Care Aide Training Requirements, PHI, 
https://phinational.org/advocacy/personal-care-aide-training-requirements/ [https://web.archive.org/
web/20201103034720/https://phinational.org/advocacy/personal-care-aide-training-requirements/] 
(showing that most states either entirely lack or have contradictory requirements for “[p]ersonal [c]are 
[a]ides”). 
 194 See Acosta v. Heart II Heart, LLC, No. 2:17-cv-1242, 2019 WL 5197329, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 
15, 2019) (using the economic realities test to find that a home care agency misclassified its workers 
as independent contractors). 
 195 NELP: NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT, supra note 13, at 1–2; Ruckelshaus, supra note 99, at 381. 
 196 See generally Acosta v. At Home Pers. Care Servs. LLC, No. 1:18-cv-549, 2019 WL 1601997, 
at *1 (E.D. Va. Apr. 15, 2019) (stating that a home care agency misclassified its home care employees 
as independent contractors); Hawkins v. Extended Life HomeCare Ltd., No. 2:18-CV-344, 2019 WL 
952737, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 17, 2019) (noting a home care worker alleged misclassification); Wil-
liams v. Sweet Home Healthcare, LLC, No. 16-2353, 2018 WL 5885453, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 9, 
2018) (incorporating home care workers’ claims that a home care agency misclassified its worker); 
Clark v. Williamson, No. 1:16cv1413, 2018 WL 1626305, at *1 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 30, 2018) (explain-
ing an allegation of misclassification). 
 197 See Hallett, supra note 10, at 128 (indicating that only employers need to post notices about 
FLSA protections). Even if workers can see it, a poster is unlikely to convey enough information to 
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nesses that classify their workers as independent contractors to disseminate 
information about labor protections.198 Even when the FLSA requires an em-
ployer to post pertinent regulations in a workplace, the law does not require 
information in multiple languages under most circumstances.199 Home care 
workers also spend significant time in their clients’ homes, which may unique-
ly limit their access to know-your-rights materials.200 Home care workers may 
not recognize that they are suffering from misclassification without assistance 
from a union, community organization, or legal representative.201 
B. Immigration Laws Restrict Foreign-Born Individuals from  
Entering the Home Care Industry 
In addition to dealing with weak FLSA enforcement that contributes to 
high turnover and worker mistreatment, the home care industry is struggling to 
recruit foreign-born workers due to restrictive immigration laws.202 Existing 
visa programs do not prioritize direct care workers.203 Long wait times and 
high fees can render these programs inaccessible or unappealing to prospective 
caregivers.204 Additionally, the IRCA’s prohibition on hiring undocumented 
                                                                                                                           
demonstrate to employees whether they have been misclassified. See id. (suggesting that posters can-
not adequately communicate concepts that workers need to comprehend to enforce their rights). 
 198 See Hallett, supra note 10, at 128 (noting that only employers must post FLSA protections); 
Pearce & Silva, supra note 104, at 13 (stating that FLSA provisions apply solely to employment rela-
tionships). 
 199 Hallett, supra note 10, at 128–29. Given the large proportion of immigrants working in home 
care, a lack of information in languages other than English could pose a significant challenge. See 
Zallman et al., supra note 9, at 923 (noting that a third of home care workers are immigrants). Moreo-
ver, the FLSA’s regulatory scheme is complex. Hallett, supra note 10, at 128. 
 200 See Dresser, supra note 31, at 121–22 (describing how home care workers become isolated 
because they work in their client’s homes). The degree of isolation that home care workers experience 
varies due to many factors, including whether they live with their clients and whether they work di-
rectly for a family or individual. Id. Home care workers with fewer contacts may lack a support sys-
tem. Id. at 121. Therefore, isolated home workers can be more vulnerable to labor violations. Id. at 
122. 
 201 See Hallett, supra note 10, at 105 (pointing to a study that showed almost 60% of laborers 
were unaware of certain wage and hour protections); Weil, supra note 11, at 9 (suggesting that work-
ers are more likely to file complaints if they have an advocate helping them to navigate the process). 
 202 See Rasalam, supra note 17, at 408 (pointing to limitations on immigration as a barrier to 
recruiting more workers to care for elderly and disabled individuals). 
 203 See Zallman et al., supra note 9, at 925 (arguing that immigration restrictions limit the pool of 
potential direct care workers in the United States); Scalzo, supra note 17, at 931 (asserting that U.S. 
visa programs put unskilled workers at a disadvantage, compared to individuals with high education 
and professional status). 
 204 See U.S. Dep’t of State—Bureau of Consular Affs., Fees for Visa Services, TRAVEL.STATE.
GOV https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/us-visas/visa-information-resources/fees/fees-visa-services.
html [https://perma.cc/MT5Y-A72M] (listing application fees in excess of $300). Although the U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services does not publish how many applicants are waiting for immi-
grant employment-based visa approval, its website warns that it can take a long time for unskilled 
workers to receive them. Employment-Based Immigration: Third Preference EB-3, U.S. CITIZENSHIP 
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workers probably incentivizes workers without legal immigration status to 
seek employment through the gray market, outside the protection of federal 
labor law.205 Undocumented caregivers who work for home care agencies may 
also be less likely to report or litigate claims concerning FLSA violations due 
to fear of deportation.206 
Prospective home care workers lack just and legal avenues to work in the 
United States.207 The EB-3 visa, which is the only immigrant employment-
based visa available to unskilled workers, is difficult for caregivers to ob-
tain.208 Even if all of the 10,000 EB-3 visas available for unskilled laborers 
went to home care workers each year, it would do little to alleviate the funda-
mental shortage.209 Additionally, nonimmigrant visas, which enable workers to 
come to the United States on a temporary basis, are not open to home care 
workers.210 The H-1B, H-2A, and H-2B visa programs do not target individu-
als who would perform long-term caregiving services.211 Even if home care 
workers could easily obtain temporary visas, they would not have the oppor-
tunity to remain in the United States long-term.212 Moreover, H-2 visas are an 
unattractive option given their association with human trafficking and other 
forms of exploitation.213 Employers may abuse H-2 visa holders by encourag-
                                                                                                                           
& IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/working-united-states/permanent-workers/employment-
based-immigration-third-preference-eb-3 [https://perma.cc/XJ6R-XXRJ] (Apr. 4, 2020). The United 
States limits visa allocation to applicants from certain countries. HESS & HENRICI, supra note 21, at 8. 
As a result, applicants from some countries may need to wait several years to receive an employment-
based visa. Id. 
 205 See Zallman et al., supra note 9, at 922–23 (indicating that immigrants and undocumented 
people are more likely than U.S. citizens to work as caregivers through informal arrangements). 
 206 See Ruckelshaus, supra note 99, at 385 (stressing that undocumented individuals are less like-
ly to report labor abuses due to worries about reprisal from their employers and immigration enforce-
ment authorities). 
 207 See supra notes 118–142 and accompanying text (describing immigrant and nonimmigrant 
visa programs linked to employment, which structurally disfavor home care workers). 
 208 HESS & HENRICI, supra note 21, at 8. 
 209 See Zallman et al., supra note 9, at 920 (predicting a caregiver shortage of over half a million 
workers within ten years); Scalzo, supra note 17, at 935 (noting that the visa system caps allocation to 
unskilled workers, which would include home care workers). 
 210 See HESS & HENRICI, supra note 21, at 7 (explaining that home care workers do not fit neatly 
into the temporary worker visa categories). 
 211 See supra notes 130–142 and accompanying text (outlining the H-1B, H-2A, and H-2B 
nonimmigrant visa programs, and then explaining why prospective caregivers would not qualify for 
them). 
 212 See Griffith, supra note 102, at 131–32 (noting that the H-1B nonimmigrant visa is distin-
guishable from the H-2 programs because H-1B visa holders can obtain green cards whereas H-2 visa 
holders cannot). 
 213 See Note, Counteracting the Bias: The Department of Labor’s Unique Opportunity to Combat 
Human Trafficking, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1012, 1029–30 (2013) (discussing the use of temporary H-2 
visa programs to traffic workers); Catherine DiSanto, Comment, Beauty and the H-2Beast: How the 
Equality State Fails Its Female Guest Workers, 18 WYO. L. REV. 321, 324–26 (2018) (detailing his-
torical and current abuses related to temporary work visa programs). 
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ing workers to accumulate debt before entering the United States, taking work-
ers’ travel documents, and failing to pay their employees for their work.214 
The lack of viable legal options for immigrants to enter the United States 
may encourage undocumented workers to enter the informal economy.215 In 
the home care context, this means that undocumented workers contract directly 
with clients and their families through the gray market.216 These types of in-
formal agreements are not subject to FLSA protections.217 Moreover, undocu-
mented individuals working as caregivers remain at risk of detention and de-
portation at all times.218 This not only endangers undocumented caregivers and 
their families, but also creates instability for the elderly and disabled individu-
als who rely on home care workers to survive.219 
C. Policy Proposals to Address the Home Care Crisis 
Diverse stakeholders, including unions, academics, and legislators, are 
searching for policies that can help attract, retain, and empower home care 
workers.220 Many initiatives focus on improving the quality of home care 
work.221 These measures include increasing home care workers’ wages and 
                                                                                                                           
 214 Counteracting the Bias: The Department of Labor’s Unique Opportunity to Combat Human 
Trafficking, supra note 213, at 1029. 
 215 See HESS & HENRICI, supra note 21, at 13 (noting that undocumented workers might be 
overrepresented among informal caregivers because individuals and families are less inclined to dig 
into whether they have work authorization); Smith Nightingale & Wandner, supra note 46, at 3–4 
(suggesting that undocumented individuals engage in the informal economy because they lack the 
ability to accept legal employment). 
 216 See Span, supra note 50 (offering an example of an undocumented home care worker who 
cares for a woman in her nineties). 
 217 See Third Party Employment, 29 C.F.R. § 552.109(a) (2020) (allowing clients and families 
that directly employ home care workers to claim the companionship services exemption); HESS & 
HENRICI, supra note 21, at 13 (indicating that undocumented caregivers are at especially high risk of 
being underpaid). 
 218 See Span, supra note 50 (profiling an elderly woman and her caregiver, both of whom worry 
that immigration enforcement authorities will detain and deport the woman’s home care worker). 
 219 Ina Jaffe, U.S. Immigration Policy Threatens Shake-Up In Home Health Business, MORNING 
EDITION (Mar. 5, 2018), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2018/03/05/587691189/immigrants-
who-staff-home-health-care-in-the-u-s-worry-about-deportation [https://perma.cc/DZX2-96BT] (de-
scribing an undocumented caregiver’s contingency plan to return to Mexico with her children if they 
need to leave the U.S.); Span, supra note 50. If an elderly or disabled person relies on a home care 
worker who is deported, the client may experience problems due to the sudden lack of a caregiver. 
Span, supra. 
 220 See supra note 162 and accompanying text (explaining that legislators, think tanks, and unions 
are making efforts to reform the home care industry). 
 221 See Direct CARE Opportunity Act, S. 2521, 116th Cong. (2019) (providing funding to im-
prove training for home care workers); Domestic Workers Bill of Rights Act, S. 2112, 116th Cong. 
(2019) (requiring the expansion of benefits for domestic workers such as paid sick time and an abuse 
hotline); Raise the Wage Act, S. 150, 116th Cong. (2019) (increasing the federal minimum wage for 
all FLSA-covered employees). 
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promoting avenues for professional advancement.222 Some scholars and inter-
est groups are also calling for immigration policy reforms that would fill va-
cancies in the home care industry.223 These proposals seek to mitigate the ex-
pected shortage of caregivers in the coming years.224 
As a threshold matter, low compensation and measly benefits currently 
hinder the recruitment and retention of home care workers, but proponents of a 
livable wage for service work could bring more financial security to the indus-
try.225 In 2019, members of Congress introduced the Raise the Wage Act.226 
This bill would amend the FLSA to increase the federal minimum wage to fif-
teen dollars per hour.227 Moreover, the Domestic Workers Bill of Rights Act, 
also introduced in 2019, would amend the FLSA to mandate certain benefits 
for domestic workers.228 The bill would require covered domestic employers to 
provide their workers with earned sick leave, regular breaks, and temporary 
schedule changes.229 If enacted, these bills could attract new home care work-
ers and reduce turnover in the industry.230 
                                                                                                                           
 222 See supra notes 20–22 and accompanying text (discussing the Service Employees International 
Union’s “Fight for $15” campaign, scholars’ proposals for immigration reform that benefits home care 
workers, and congressional bills intended to improve home care jobs). 
 223 HESS & HENRICI, supra note 21, at 21; Stone & Bryant, supra note 9, at 54–55; Rasalam, 
supra note 17, at 439. Some advocates would like to create a new visa program for noncitizen home 
care workers. HESS & HENRICI, supra note 21, at 15–17. Proponents of this approach typically fall 
into two camps: (1) advocates of a temporary visa that expires after a term of years, or (2) proponents 
of a provisional visa that allows caregivers a conditional path to permanent residency. See id. (describ-
ing temporary and provisional visas). Canada has a provisional visa program for live-in caregivers, 
which allows them to apply for permanent residency after working as care providers for two years 
within a set period. Stone & Bryant, supra note 9, at 55. In contrast, Israel issues temporary visas to 
noncitizen caregivers that expire after five years. Id. 
 224 S. 2521; S. 2112; HESS & HENRICI, supra note 21, at 15–17, 21; Stone & Bryant, supra note 9, 
at 54–55; Rasalam, supra note 17, at 424. 
 225 SCALES, supra note 6, at 19 (underscoring the importance of enhanced compensation to attract 
and keep more workers in the home care industry). 
 226 Raise the Wage Act, H.R. 582, 116th Cong. (2019). The House of Representatives passed the 
bill, and it has been on the calendar for consideration in the Senate since the summer of 2019. 
H.R.582—Raise the Wage Act, CONGRESS.GOV (2019–2020), https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-
congress/house-bill/582/all-actions?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22H.R.+582%22%5D%7D
&s=3&r=1 [https://perma.cc/DPE6-SWF5]. 
 227 29 U.S.C. § 206 (establishing the federal minimum wage); Raise the Wage Act, S. 150, 116th 
Cong. § 2(a)(1) (2019) (outlining a schedule for increasing the federal minimum wage within five 
years of enacting the Raise the Wage Act). 
 228 Domestic Workers Bill of Rights, H.R. 3760, 116th Cong. (2019); S. 2112. 
 229 S. 2112 §§ 111, 112, 115. The Domestic Workers Bill of Rights Act would also provide re-
sources to domestic workers who encounter sexual harassment and stalking. Id. § 121. The Act in-
cludes specific data collection provisions regarding home care workers to better understand turnover 
in the industry and increase reimbursement rates for care covered under Medicaid. Id. § 402. 
 230 See SCALES, supra note 6, at 19 (stressing the need to improve retention and recruitment in the 
home care industry). A 2020 report about the home care industry indicated that approximately 20% of 
home care workers are searching for another job at any given time. Id. at 17. 
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Additionally, a lack of opportunity for job training and advancement may 
contribute to the home care industry’s recruitment and retention problems.231 
The Direct CARE Opportunity Act, which members of Congress introduced in 
2019, would attempt to mitigate staffing challenges by providing funding to 
organizations that train and mentor home care workers.232 Some scholars fur-
ther recommend that state legislators amend their scope of practice laws, 
which restrict the tasks that home care workers can do.233 Proponents of these 
measures argue that home care workers will enjoy additional opportunities for 
career advancement and command higher wages if they can perform more ser-
vices, such as administering medications.234 These approaches seek to create 
sustainability in the provision of direct care.235 
In addition to efforts to improve the quality of home care jobs, some ex-
perts believe that loosening immigration restrictions could proactively mitigate 
shortages in the home care industry.236 This would mirror the approach that 
Japan, another country facing a dearth of direct care workers, has taken in re-
                                                                                                                           
 231 Direct CARE Opportunity Act, H.R. 4397, 116th Cong. (2019); Direct CARE Opportunity 
Act, S. 2521, 116th Cong. (2019). The findings section of the Direct CARE Opportunity Act claims 
that a lack of opportunities for advancement and training contribute to low compensation in the home 
care industry. S. 2521 § 2. The bill further notes that enhanced training could reduce retention prob-
lems in the field. Id. § 2(11). 
 232 H.R. 4397; S. 2521 (establishing a grant program to provide funding to entities that train home 
care workers). 
 233 Paul Osterman, Improving Job Quality for Direct Care Workers, 33 ECON. DEV. Q. 151, 152, 
153 (2018) (championing scope of practice law reform to enable home care workers to take on in-
creased responsibilities). 
 234 JOANNE SPETZ, HEALTHFORCE CTR. UCSF, HOME HEALTH AIDES AND PERSONAL CARE 
ASSISTANTS: SCOPE OF PRACTICE REGULATIONS AND THEIR IMPACT ON CARE 8 (2019), https://
healthforce.ucsf.edu/sites/healthforce.ucsf.edu/files/publication-pdf/HomeCareAidesScopePractice
Laws.pdf [https://perma.cc/PS49-NNBJ] (showing that only thirty-seven states allow home care 
workers to provide clients with medicine taken by mouth); Osterman, supra note 233, at 152–54. 
Other policies intended to make direct care work more desirable, including raising the minimum 
wage, have various drawbacks, namely feasibility issues. Osterman, supra note 233, at 153. Advo-
cates hope that reform, coupled with educational programs designed to enhance home care workers’ 
skillsets, could lead to increases in renumeration. Id. at 154. Moreover, expanding the scope-of-
practice laws for home care workers could make meeting client’s needs more efficient. Id. 
 235 See S. 2521 § 2 (recognizing the value of caregivers’ work and pointing to low wages, high 
turnover, and lack of opportunities for advancement as factors that exacerbate the shortage of profes-
sional caregivers in the United States). In addition to increasing compensation, reform efforts should 
also focus on celebrating caregivers and the crucial work they do. Molly Kinder, Essential but Under-
valued: Millions of Health Care Workers Aren’t Getting the Pay or Respect They Deserve in the 
COVID-19 Pandemic, BROOKINGS (May 28, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/research/essential-
but-undervalued-millions-of-health-care-workers-arent-getting-the-pay-or-respect-they-deserve-in-
the-covid-19-pandemic/ [https://perma.cc/P2LF-MGZL]. One home care worker remarked on the 
stark difference between the appreciation society has expressed for healthcare workers and the silence 
surrounding her own contributions. Id. 
 236 HESS & HENRICI, supra note 21, at 21; Stone & Bryant, supra note 9, at 54–55; Zallman et al., 
supra note 9, at 925; Rasalam, supra note 17, at 424. 
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cent years.237 Advocates of immigration reform argue that legislators should 
amend the INA to recruit more home care workers.238 Although proposals dif-
fer, most would tweak existing programs or develop a new visa category spe-
cifically for caregivers.239 The home care industry relies to a large extent on 
immigrants, and thus without such reforms the domestic labor pool is unlikely 
to meet the ballooning demand for long-term, direct care services.240 
III. PREVENTING EXPLOITATION IN THE HOME CARE INDUSTRY WHILE 
REMEDYING THE LOOMING CAREGIVER SHORTFALL 
Any legislative solution that seeks to promote the home care industry 
must focus on improving conditions and pay for existing workers, as well as 
on attracting new caregivers.241 Section A of this Part argues that Congress 
should pass the Wage Theft Prevention and Wage Recovery Act (WTPWRA) 
or similar legislation to formalize the DOL’s strategic FLSA enforcement and 
community partnership initiatives.242 Section B contends that Congress should 
reform immigrant employment-based visa programs to prioritize long-term 
caregivers and other essential workers.243 
                                                                                                                           
 237 Motoko Rich, Bucking a Global Trend, Japan Seeks More Immigrants. Ambivalently., N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/07/world/asia/japan-parliament-foreign-
workers.html [https://perma.cc/7D9J-6XP5]. Japan’s new visa program for unskilled workers went 
into effect in 2019. Id. It provides workers with temporary visas that are valid for a maximum of five 
years. Id. 
 238 See supra note 223 and accompanying text (detailing policy proposals for temporary and pro-
visional visas intended to increase opportunities for immigrants to work as caregivers). Congress 
could establish a new visa program for home care workers by amending the INA. Rasalam, supra note 
17, at 439. 
 239 See supra notes 223, 236–238 and accompanying text (providing examples of proposed plans 
that would create more opportunities for immigrants to fill vacancies in long-term care service indus-
tries). Congress neglected to set aside visas for direct care workers in a bill intended to increase the 
U.S. healthcare workforce in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. See Healthcare Workforce Resili-
ence Act, S. 3599, 116th Cong. (2020) (recommending that the government allocate unused immi-
grant employment-based visas to noncitizen nurses and doctors). 
 240 Stone & Bryant, supra note 9, at 52 (describing recruiting U.S. citizens to work in the home 
care industry as a challenge); Zallman et al., supra note 9, at 925 (suggesting that restricting immigra-
tion will exacerbate the shortfall of long-term direct care workers). 
 241 See SCALES, supra note 6, at 19–21 (calling for policy changes to increase retention and re-
cruitment in the home care industry). A recent report explained that experts believe that enhancing 
wages, improving benefits, and increasing professional opportunities are crucial ways to tackle the 
high rate of vacancies in the home care industry. Id. 
 242 See infra notes 244–263 and accompanying text. 
 243 See infra notes 264–287 and accompanying text. 
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A. Reinforcing Strategic Enforcement and Community Partnership Efforts 
To foster enforcement of FLSA protections in the home care industry, 
Congress should pass the WTPWRA or similar legislation.244 The bill would 
establish the WTPWRA Grant Program, which would assist the WHD of the 
DOL to proactively investigate home care agencies by building partnerships 
with community organizations.245 The Act would provide funding for initia-
tives like training staff to provide know-your-rights presentations at workers’ 
centers.246 The grant program would encourage community partners to direct 
the agency’s constrained resources to fields where violations occur most fre-
quently, such as the home care industry.247 
Although the WTPWRA does not specifically mention the home care in-
dustry, its emphasis on strategic enforcement and community partnership initi-
atives is critically important for protecting caregivers.248 Strategic enforcement 
is a strategy that directs the DOL’s finite policing resources toward industries 
where FLSA violations are most likely to occur.249 Moreover, community part-
nerships refer to collaborations between the WHD and organizations that sup-
port low-wage workers and immigrant populations.250 Cooperative efforts help 
the WHD root out exploitative practices when workers are afraid to come for-
                                                                                                                           
 244 Wage Theft Prevention and Wage Recovery Act, S. 2101, 116th Cong. (2019) (establishing 
tougher penalties on employers who commit wage theft and providing funding for community part-
nership enforcement activities). 
 245 See id. § 302 (describing the structure of the grant program). 
 246 Id. § 302(c)(1) (outlining authorized uses for funding allocated through the grant program). 
The types of programs eligible for funding include know-your-rights trainings, assistance for workers 
to report violations, and workplace visits with staff from the WHD and the community partner. Id. 
Beneficiaries could also use grant money to pay their employees, solicit volunteers, and distribute 
training materials. Id. In addition, the WTPWRA would allow the Secretary of Labor to expand the 
list of approved activities through administrative rulemaking. Id. § 302(c)(1)(L). 
 247 Id. § 2(25) (suggesting that the insight of community partners would help enforcement offi-
cials target workplaces that are violating labor laws); see WEIL, supra note 95, at 2 (listing home care 
as an industry that demands strategic enforcement); Hallett, supra note 10, at 124 (contending that 
strategic enforcement is more efficient and effective than relying on complaints). By channeling re-
sources into increased compliance efforts in industries with a high incidence of infractions, the WHD 
can reduce its reliance on worker complaints. Hallett, supra note 10, at 124. 
 248 S. 2101 § 302 (solely referencing the need to focus the WHD’s activities on industries with the 
most frequent violations). 
 249 Id. § 301(7) (defining strategic enforcement under the WTPWRA). 
 250 S. 210 § 301(3); Weil, supra note 11, at 9. Community partnerships encompass collaboration 
between the WHD and a range of worker advocacy groups. Weil, supra note 11, at 9. One example of 
a state-level community partnership was the Wage and Hour Watch, a collaboration between the New 
York State DOL and several community organizations. Fine & Gordon, supra note 173, at 568. The 
organizations agreed to partner with the New York State DOL for two years to distribute DOL materi-
als to employers, administer know-your-rights trainings, and notify the agency about possible infrac-
tions. Id. at 569. The New York DOL office took on the responsibility of appointing a staff member to 
coordinate the effort. Id. Additionally, the agency provided the organizations with educational materi-
als and agreed to keep them in the loop about its investigations when it was legally permissible. Id. 
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ward or do not know their rights.251 Although the WHD started to focus on 
strategic enforcement and community partnership initiatives in 2014, the grant 
program would formalize and magnify these efforts at the federal level.252 
These measures are well-suited to tackle FLSA violations in the home 
care industry.253 The demographics of the home care workforce, coupled with 
the isolation of these workers within individual homes, decrease the likelihood 
that they will complain about violations.254 Third-party agencies would be 
more likely to comply with FLSA provisions if the WHD conducted proactive 
investigations, educated home care workers about their rights, and guided 
workers through the complaint process.255 Community partnerships would aid 
these efforts by building rapport between workers and the WHD.256 Structural 
support could help overcome individual obstacles such as a lack of legal 
knowledge, high litigation costs, language barriers, and fears of retaliation.257 
                                                                                                                           
 251 Weil, supra note 11, at 8–9; see Ruckelshaus, supra note 99, at 383–84 (noting that undocu-
mented immigrants are unlikely to report FLSA violations due to concerns about retaliation). 
 252 S. 2101 § 2(25)–(28) (identifying strategic enforcement initiatives involving community part-
nerships as an effective means to enforce wage and hour protections); Weil, supra note 11, at 2 (de-
scribing the implementation of strategic enforcement initiatives under the Obama administration). 
Formalization could create a more sustainable enforcement strategy. See Fine, supra note 12, at 157–
58 (discussing the pros and cons of formal partnerships between enforcement agencies and communi-
ty organizations). Advantages of formalizing community partnerships include enhanced clarity for 
government agencies and partner organizations, increased ability to withstand changes in the political 
landscape, and greater potential to empower workers. Id. 
 253 See infra notes 254–259 and accompanying text (explaining why strategic enforcement and 
community partnership initiatives would mitigate the challenges home care workers face when at-
tempting to enforce their rights). 
 254 Dresser, supra note 31, at 121–22 (describing the effects of isolation on home care workers’ 
ability to assert their rights); see Ruckelshaus, supra note 99, at 383–84 (explaining that undocument-
ed immigrants are unlikely to enforce their rights under the FLSA due to concerns about deportation 
and getting fired); Zallman et al., supra note 9, at 923–24 (illustrating that the home care industry is 
reliant on immigrant labor). 
 255 See S. 2101 § 2(25)–(28) (suggesting that strategic enforcement strategies are more effective 
than relying on worker complaints); WEIL, supra note 95, at 2 (noting that incentives for compliance 
are very low under a complaint-based system); Hallett, supra note 10, at 106 (articulating that the 
DOL sometimes mishandles or neglects to investigate complaints from workers). 
 256 See Fine, supra note 12, at 145–46 (arguing that it is necessary to foster trust between workers 
and enforcement agencies to enforce labor laws). A community partner can act as a powerful go-
between for workers and government agencies. Id. at 151. For example, in 2011, the National Guest-
worker Alliance (NGA) alerted the Occupational Health and Safety Administration to the dangers that 
hundreds of student visa holders were facing while working in a factory that produced Hershey’s 
candy. Id. at 158–60. NGA employees met with the students, gleaned information about the abuses, 
and formulated a plan to reveal the exploitation. Id. at 160–61. When investigators from the DOL’s 
WHD arrived, the NGA utilized the connections that they forged with the students to facilitate worker 
participation in the WHD’s investigation. Id. at 161. 
 257 See Fine & Gordon, supra note 173, at 561–62 (describing how community partners could 
help low-wage laborers file complaints with enforcement agencies); Hallett, supra note 10, at 104–07 
(elaborating on factors that hinder workers from submitting complaints or engaging in lawsuits to 
address FLSA violations). Community organizations and workers’ centers can engage in know-your-
rights trainings and provide culturally appropriate services to workers. Fine & Gordon, supra note 
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Moreover, collaboration between the WHD and community organizations is 
particularly powerful in the home care industry because few workers belong to 
unions that can help them enforce their rights.258 Therefore, home care workers 
would benefit from robust strategic enforcement with the support of formal 
community partnership initiatives.259 
The WTPWRA Grant Program would bolster the WHD’s strategic en-
forcement efforts by reinforcing its commitment to community organization 
partnerships.260 Effective community partner collaboration requires WHD em-
ployees to build trusting relationships with organizations as well as with indi-
vidual workers.261 The proposed grant program would provide these organiza-
tions with vital resources and the capacity to sustainably collaborate with the 
WHD.262 Thus, the passage of the WTPWRA would help home care workers to 
systematically enforce their rights.263 
                                                                                                                           
173, at 561. Activities aimed at helping workers to file complaints would help ensure that various 
barriers would not prevent laborers from coming forward. Id. at 555, 561. This model could also re-
duce immigrant workers’ concerns about retribution. See id. at 561 (indicating that laborers might be 
more likely to address violations if a community organization can confirm that filing a complaint will 
not have immigration enforcement consequences). 
 258 See Weil, supra note 11, at 9 (noting that workers are statistically more likely to enforce their 
rights with the help of a labor organization); supra note 177 and accompanying text (explaining that 
few home care workers belong to unions). 
 259 See S. 2101 § 2(25)–(28) (suggesting that strategic enforcement can effectively address labor 
law violations in fields where labor law compliance is low); Fine, supra note 12, at 146 (arguing for 
the formalization of community partnerships); Fine & Gordon, supra note 173, at 561–62 (articulating 
why the community partnership model would prove effective for low-income and immigrant work-
ers). Community partnerships allow the WHD to connect more easily with workers to find out where 
violations are happening. Fine & Gordon, supra note 173, at 561–62; Weil, supra note 11, at 8–9 
(highlighting the importance of partnering with organizations to encourage workers to file com-
plaints). 
 260 See S. 2101 § 2(25)–(28) (stressing the importance of utilizing community partnerships to 
facilitate strategic enforcement); Fine, supra note 12, at 172 (indicating that the formalization of 
community partnerships would result in more robust collaboration between the government and or-
ganizations). 
 261 Fine & Gordon, supra note 173, at 560–61; Weil, supra note 11, at 8 (noting that laborers are 
afraid to work with government agencies due to concerns about retaliation). If a community organiza-
tion attests that a government enforcement agency is trustworthy, workers may be more likely to come 
forward about workplace abuses. Fine, supra note 12, at 151. 
 262 S. 2101 § 302; see Fine & Gordon, supra note 173, at 561 (indicating that measures to formal-
ize the community partnership model would increase FLSA enforcement in low-wage industries). The 
grant program would provide community partners with funding for hosting information sessions with 
WHD employees, visiting workplaces with WHD officials, and helping workers file complaints with 
the DOL. S. 2101 § 302(c)(1) (listing initiatives that would meet the grant program’s criteria). Moreo-
ver, the WTPWRA would permit grantees to utilize the funds for hiring and volunteer recruitment. Id. 
§ 302(c)(1)(J). 
 263 See S. 2101 § 302 (providing funding to support the creation of community partnerships to 
enhance the WHD’s strategic enforcement initiatives). 
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B. Increasing Immigration Opportunities for  
Prospective Home Care Workers 
In addition to bolstering enforcement initiatives to make it easier for 
home care workers to assert their rights under the FLSA, Congress should en-
act immigration reforms that make it easier for noncitizens to enter the home 
care industry.264 Even if legislative changes render home care jobs more desir-
able, with higher wages and attractive benefit packages, it is unlikely that the 
existing labor pool can meet the growing demand for caregivers.265 Giving 
home care workers without legal status the means to obtain citizenship and 
increasing opportunities for noncitizens to emigrate to the United States could 
help alleviate the projected shortfall of direct care workers.266 
First, Congress should amend the INA to provide undocumented immi-
grants living in the United States with a path to citizenship.267 This would al-
low caregivers currently relegated to under-the-table work to enter regulated 
parts of the industry and alleviate their concerns about deportation.268 This pol-
icy could bring more home care workers under FLSA coverage, thereby reduc-
                                                                                                                           
 264 HESS & HENRICI, supra note 21, at 21 (supporting the creation of a visa program for prospec-
tive home care workers); see Zallman et al., supra note 9, at 925 (estimating that restrictive immigra-
tion policies will contribute to the projected shortfall of home care workers in the United States); 
Rasalam, supra note 17, at 439 (arguing that Congress should amend the INA in order to create a new 
visa program for caregivers). 
 265 See HESS & HENRICI, supra note 21, at 3 (indicating that it will continue to be difficult to 
attract U.S. citizen caregivers); SCALES, supra note 6, at 21 (advocating for policies that facilitate the 
recruitment of immigrant workers); Rasalam, supra note 17, at 424 (suggesting that immigration re-
form is needed to remedy the shortage of direct care workers in the United States). Measures to recruit 
more home care workers from the domestic population could, however, include efforts to attract more 
men and young people to the profession. SCALES, supra note 6, at 20. There is also an initiative to 
encourage healthy retirees to enter the field. Id. 
 266 HESS & HENRICI, supra note 21, at 15 (describing a proposal that would grant amnesty to 
undocumented workers already engaged in home care); Zallman et al., supra note 9, at 925 (indicating 
that restrictive immigration policies will exacerbate the expected shortfall of caregivers); Rasalam, 
supra note 17, at 439 (proposing the creation of a special visa program for home care workers). 
 267 HESS & HENRICI, supra note 21, at 15 (discussing a reform that would allow undocumented 
home care workers to gain legal work authorization and become permanent residents); Friedersdorf, 
supra note 26 (supporting amnesty for all undocumented immigrants as a policy that would help indi-
vidual families as well as the country as a whole). Surveys suggest that most people in the U.S. sup-
port offering conditional amnesty to undocumented individuals. Friedersdorf, supra note 26. 
 268 HESS & HENRICI, supra note 21, at 15 (outlining a plan for undocumented home care workers 
to attain conditional amnesty, which would help stabilize the caregiving workforce); Smith Nightin-
gale & Wandner, supra note 46, at 3–4 (indicating that undocumented individuals have no option but 
to work outside of the scope of legal employment); Span, supra note 50 (describing the anxiety that 
clients and undocumented home care providers feel due to immigration law enforcement efforts). 
Millions of undocumented immigrants have provided essential services during the COVID-19 pan-
demic, despite having few labor rights or avenues for relief. See Lissandra Villa, ‘We’re Ignored 
Completely.’ Amid the Pandemic, Undocumented Immigrants Are Essential but Exposed, TIME (Apr. 
17, 2020), https://time.com/5823491/undocumented-immigrants-essential-coronavirus/ [https://
perma.cc/TZ35-R9W3]. 
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ing exploitation in the industry.269 Moreover, an amnesty program would en-
courage newly documented home care workers to form lasting bonds with their 
clients and the United States.270 Caregivers would not need to worry that im-
migration enforcement authorities could detain them at any moment, which 
would improve the stability of their relationships with clients as well as the 
consistency of the care they provide.271 
Moreover, Congress should amend the INA to reform the preference sys-
tem for immigrant employment-based visas.272 Instead of prioritizing only ap-
plicants with extraordinary abilities, legislators should give higher preference 
to individuals who would qualify as essential workers.273 Although federal 
agencies and state governments categorize such workers in different ways, 
home care workers often make the list.274 Congress should also increase the 
number and proportion of the employment-based visas available to essential 
workers, regardless of their skill level, in specific industries that cannot meet 
demand with native workers.275 The COVID-19 pandemic has underscored the 
                                                                                                                           
 269 See HESS & HENRICI, supra note 21, at 15 (suggesting that a policy that enables undocument-
ed caregivers to attain legal immigration status could result in better working conditions for formally 
undocumented immigrants). A plan that provides legal status to undocumented home care workers 
could result in more opportunities for them to engage with society, including the freedom to accept 
work in the formal economy. Id. 
 270 See Span, supra note 50 (profiling an elderly woman and her caregiver, both of whom fear that 
immigration enforcement authorities will detain and deport the woman’s caregiver). 
 271 See id. (exemplifying the strain that concerns about immigration enforcement place on rela-
tionships between home care clients and caregivers). 
 272 See Scalzo, supra note 17, at 945 (advocating for the reallocation of immigrant employment-
based visas in accordance with the number of applicants applying in each category). 
 273 See COVID-19: Essential Workers in the States, NCSL: NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLA-
TURE (May 21, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/covid-19-essential-
workers-in-the-states.aspx [https://perma.cc/3MX4-FMAK] (defining essential workers as individuals 
whose activities are necessary for society to keep functioning); Scalzo, supra note 17, at 945 (indicat-
ing that Congress can adjust the immigrant employment-based visa system to increase the number of 
visas available to unskilled workers). The current employment-based visa preference structure re-
serves close to one third of visas for individuals with extraordinary abilities, despite the fact that peo-
ple who are eligible for this category make up less than 10% of applicants. Scalzo, supra note 17, at 
945.  
 274 See Advisory Memorandum from Christopher C. Krebs, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Sec. 
Agency Dir., U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., on Ensuring Essential Critical Infrastructure Workers 
Ability to Work During the Covid-19 Response 7 (Aug. 18, 2020), https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/
files/publications/Version_4.0_CISA_Guidance_on_Essential_Critical_Infrastructure_Workers_
FINAL%20AUG%2018v3.pdf [https://perma.cc/RRV4-LU4F] (including home care workers under 
the umbrella of essential workers); COVID-19: Essential Workers in the States, supra note 273 (not-
ing that twenty of the forty-two states that issued guidelines for classifying essential workers relied on 
the Department of Homeland Security’s classifications). 
 275 See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(B) (capping the number of immigrant employment-based visas 
available to unskilled workers at 10,000); Joel Gunter, What Is the Einstein Visa? And How Did 
Melania Trump Get One?, BBC NEWS (Mar. 2, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-
43256318 [https://perma.cc/D8PN-5G56] (indicating that individuals with shrewd lawyers and per-
sonal connections can obtain EB-1 visas regardless of whether their work is actually extraordinary); 
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contributions of essential workers, and future legislative reform should reflect 
our renewed collective understanding of their value to society.276 
This new visa preference and allocation system would reduce barriers that 
prevent home care workers from legally immigrating to the United States.277 
First, it would offer a sustainable path to permanent residency for noncitizen 
home care workers.278 This would provide an extra enticement for noncitizens 
to consider entering the field.279 Additionally, immigrant employment-based 
visas would allow noncitizen home care workers to foster deeper connections 
with their clients and report labor violations without fear of deportation.280 
This could help cut down on turnover and exploitation in the industry.281 
Any attempt to provide more opportunities for noncitizens to reside per-
manently in the United States is likely to provoke staunch opposition.282 Some 
will argue that an influx of noncitizen home care and other essential workers 
                                                                                                                           
Kinder, supra note 235 (calling for legislative and cultural changes that valorize essential workers’ 
contributions to society); Scalzo, supra note 17, at 945 (suggesting that it is possible to reform the 
preference system for immigrant employment-based visas). The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted 
the work that matters, so reforms should reflect that reality. Kinder, supra note 235. 
 276 See Kinder, supra note 235 (advocating for legislation that will raise essential workers’ wages, 
provide them with protective equipment, and demonstrate appreciation for the vital role that they play 
in society). 
 277 See supra notes 207–214 and accompanying text (explaining that none of the existing visa 
programs linked to employment are viable options for prospective home care workers). 
 278 See HESS & HENRICI, supra note 21, at 13 (demonstrating the importance of providing immi-
grant home care workers with the resources that they need to do their jobs effectively and avoid ex-
ploitation); Rasalam, supra note 17, at 439 (supporting the formation of a visa program that gives 
immigrant home care workers the opportunity to remain in the United States on a permanent basis). 
Immigration reform could also increase diversity in the field, which could prove beneficial as more 
immigrants and people of color require long-term care. See SCALES, supra note 6, at 10 (suggesting 
that the percentage of elderly immigrants and people of color will grow in the coming years, and that 
greater diversity in the workforce could help meet these populations’ unique needs). 
 279 Rasalam, supra note 17, at 439. 
 280 See 8 U.S.C. § 1154 (permitting employment-based visa holders to apply for green cards); 
Ruckelshaus, supra note 99, at 385 (noting that undocumented people are especially fearful of filing 
complaints about labor violations); Span, supra note 50 (implying that the current status of undocu-
mented home care workers fosters uncertainty for immigrants and their clients). 
 281 See supra notes 277–280 and accompanying text (discussing why a visa program that offers 
home care workers the opportunity to apply for green cards would benefit workers as well as their 
clients). 
 282 See Kamarck & Stenglein, supra note 23 (recounting the failure of Congress to pass extensive 
immigration reform measures since 1986); see also SCALES, supra note 6, at 20–21 (highlighting the 
anti-immigrant policies enacted since 2016). President Donald J. Trump used xenophobic language 
and promoted policies that adversely impact immigrants, including individuals working as profession-
al caregivers. See Span, supra note 50 (discussing how President Trump’s decision to end temporary 
protected status for individuals from several countries, implement travel bans, and terminate the De-
ferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program could harm the home care industry). Anti-immigrant 
sentiment and political strife surrounding immigration reform, however, predate the Trump presiden-
cy. Kamarck & Stenglein, supra note 23. Proposals to grant amnesty to undocumented immigrants 
collapsed during President George Bush’s time in office, and more recent attempts at reform have 
failed to pass both houses of Congress. Id. 
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could displace Americans working in these industries.283 Fear of competition 
for jobs is unwarranted, however, as experts predict the shortfall of direct care 
workers will be so severe that local workforces will not be able to meet the 
demand.284 Congress could responsively calibrate the proportion of available 
visas to match vacancies in home care and fill other essential positions.285 Fur-
thermore, a retooled immigrant employment-based visa program that provides 
a pathway for unskilled workers to legally work in the United States may re-
duce illegal immigration, and bring the home care gray market within regulato-
ry oversight.286 If adopted in conjunction with other policies to improve the 
professional status of home care, visa reform could help attract immigrant 
home care workers without hindering the recruitment of U.S. citizens.287 
CONCLUSION 
The people who care for the United States’ growing elderly and disabled 
population perform an invaluable service to society. Despite this, labor and 
immigration laws render this field undesirable, inaccessible, and unprotected. 
Home care workers deserve respect, compassion, and living wages. With this 
in mind, Congress should support meaningful labor law enforcement mecha-
nisms and reform the immigrant employment-based visa program to attract 
additional home care workers. The FLSA’s protections do not serve home care 
workers. Instead of relying on workers to proactively dismantle their own ex-
ploitation, Congress should prioritize strategic workplace enforcement and 
strengthen community partnerships to disseminate know-your-rights infor-
mation and encourage employee reporting. Congress should also grant amnes-
ty to undocumented workers, and reconfigure and expand the employment-
based visa program to recruit and retain caregivers by offering them a viable 
path to citizenship. Although these policies will not alleviate all the challenges 
                                                                                                                           
 283 Rasalam, supra note 17, at 430 (highlighting concerns about the impact of immigration on 
homegrown workers). Immigration can promote economic growth. See Frederick Treyz & Peter 
Evangelakis, Immigration and United States Economic Growth, 53 BUS. ECONS. 134, 134 (2018) 
(indicating that the national economy would suffer if net immigration stopped). Studies concerning 
the impact of an influx of unskilled immigrant workers on the wages of U.S. citizens working in low-
wage sectors are not decisive. Eric D. Gould, Explaining the Unexplained: Residual Wage Inequality, 
Manufacturing Decline and Low-Skilled Immigration, 129 ECON. J. 1281, 1285–86 (2019). 
 284 See supra notes 238–240 and accompanying text (prompting the U.S. government to expand 
opportunities for immigrants to mitigate the looming shortage of direct care workers). 
 285 See Rasalam, supra note 17, at 441 (suggesting that a new visa program could be limited in 
scope in order to cover vacancies that U.S. citizens cannot fill). 
 286 See id. at 431 (arguing that immigrants will have less incentivize to enter the United States 
without work authorization if there are more avenues to access legally-sanctioned, regulated work). 
 287 See HESS & HENRICI, supra note 21, at 21 (stressing the need for immigration reform to occur 
in tandem with policies to improve the quality of home care jobs); Zallman et al., supra note 9, at 925 
(implying that immigrants will be instrumental to meeting increasing demand for long-term care ser-
vices). 
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home care workers and their clients face, they will help foster conditions that 
allow both groups to flourish. 
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